Korea Formally Notifies IAEA of Intent to Consult on Safeguards Arrangement for Nuclear-Powered Submarines
Key Takeaways
- •Korea has formally notified the IAEA of its intention to start consultations on an Article 14 arrangement under its comprehensive safeguards agreement for nuclear-powered submarines.
- •Article 14 of the CSA allows nuclear material to be used for non-nuclear military purposes such as naval propulsion, but no non-nuclear-weapon state has completed such an arrangement before.
- •The submarine program follows security agreements reached at an October summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump.
- •Grossi said Korea has reiterated its NPT, CSA, and Additional Protocol commitments and provided the relevant declarations to the agency.
- •Korea aims to launch its first nuclear-powered submarine in the mid-2030s and deploy it with the Navy in the late 2030s.

Korea has formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to begin consultations on a safeguards arrangement for its envisioned nuclear-powered submarines, according to the agency's chief.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi made the announcement during the IAEA Board of Governors meeting at the agency's headquarters in Vienna, Austria, on Monday (local time). The development comes as Korea pushes to build conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, following security agreements reached at a summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump in October last year.
In a statement provided by his office, Grossi said that with regard to nuclear-powered submarines, Korea "has formally notified the Secretariat of its intention to start consultations with the Agency on an arrangement pursuant to Article 14 of its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)."
Article 14 of the CSA permits a country to use nuclear material for non-nuclear military purposes, such as nuclear-powered naval propulsion, under an arrangement with the IAEA. No non-nuclear-weapon state has yet completed such an arrangement for a naval propulsion program, meaning the negotiations between Seoul and the agency would set a notable precedent for how IAEA safeguards apply to nuclear material withdrawn from routine verification for military naval use.
Grossi noted that Seoul has "reiterated its commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the CSA and the Additional Protocol" and has provided the agency with the relevant declarations. He added that he looks "forward to the continuation of our consultations in the same spirit of transparency."
Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from using nuclear material for nuclear weapons purposes and are required to accept IAEA safeguards to verify that their nuclear activities remain peaceful. Korea maintains a CSA with the IAEA as part of its nonproliferation obligations.
"We are proceeding with the necessary procedures to demonstrate that we are taking a transparent approach," an official from Seoul's foreign ministry said.
Speaking at a press conference in June, Grossi said a solid agreement between Korea and the IAEA should alleviate any proliferation concerns related to Seoul's nuclear-powered submarine project. He also noted that discussions between the two sides on an Article 14 arrangement were at an early stage. The outcome of the consultations is likely to draw close attention from other NPT member states, as the precedent could shape how similar future programs by non-nuclear-weapon states are handled under IAEA safeguards.
Korea has set a goal of launching its first nuclear-powered submarine in the mid-2030s and deploying it with the Navy in the late 2030s.