President Donald Trump has made clear that, if he has the power to do so, he would seek to prevent Democrats from winning the 2026 midterm elections, according to Dr. Steven Levitsky, a professor of government at Harvard University.

In an interview with AlterNet, Levitsky said there was a “non-zero chance” Trump could turn the United States into an effective dictatorship before the 2026 election cycle ends. Although the president does not have the legal authority to declare martial law, deploy the military or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to seize ballots, or direct Republicans in Congress to refuse to seat elected Democrats, Levitsky said Trump may possess the “de facto” power to attempt such actions in defiance of the law.

Trump has already carried out mass deportations, silenced media critics, imposed tariffs, altered national monuments and placed his name on public property, regardless of questions about the legality of those actions, Levitsky said. He also attempted to overturn the 2020 presidential election after losing to Joe Biden and later returned to power with the support of right-wing media and the acquiescence of major legal and business institutions.

Levitsky said those developments have weakened American democracy. In his view, the United States is no longer a consolidated democracy, in which political institutions and actors can be expected to follow democratic rules. Instead, it has become an “unconsolidated democracy,” in which it is uncertain whether basic democratic structures will remain intact.

The interview has been lightly edited for clarity, context and length.

The possibility of using force to disrupt the midterms

Rozsa: President Trump has repeatedly said, either directly or through surrogates, that he is considering declaring a national emergency, imposing martial law, sending ICE or the military to polling places, and otherwise interfering with the election process. Does he have the authority to do these things?

Levitsky: It depends on whether you mean de facto power or legal and constitutional power. I am not a constitutional expert, but most experts would agree that he does not have the formal authority to do these things. The Constitution gives the federal executive almost no authority over election administration. That responsibility belongs to the states. The type of federal intervention Trump is discussing would almost certainly be unconstitutional.

The real question is whether he has the de facto power to do it—whether he can carry it out. From the outset, I have no doubt that Trump is willing to order some kind of coup against democracy in an attempt to overturn an election. He has repeatedly shown that he is not a democrat and is willing to use old-fashioned authoritarian tactics to overturn elections.

We do not know whether he could get away with it. There are troubling signs. One is that the United States is completely unprepared for this kind of radical seizure of power. The courts have been reasonably effective, though not perfectly so, in responding to Trump’s efforts to exceed his authority over elections. But courts move slowly. It is not clear that, if Trump ordered the seizure of ballot boxes, declared an emergency or mobilized troops on election night, the courts could act quickly enough to stop him. At a minimum, such actions would create a massive crisis.

Ultimately, however, I do not think Trump has the power to succeed. The possibility is nevertheless well above zero. Trump’s public support and political power are in fairly sharp decline. There is considerable evidence that the most successful assaults on democracy are carried out by presidents with 70%, 80% or 85% support, such as Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chávez, Alberto Fujimori and Nayib Bukele. All of those leaders had support levels around 80%. Trump’s support is at 35% or 36%.

The Trump administration’s record in planning and executing major initiatives—from the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to the “Liberation Day” tariffs and the war in Iran—shows what appears to be extreme incompetence, a lack of foresight, poor coordination and inadequate planning. Fraud is difficult. Repression is difficult. Destroying constitutional rule is difficult. If I had to bet a dollar, although I am glad I do not, I would say they lack the capacity to do it.

Rozsa: Justin Levitt of Loyola Law School was very doubtful that Trump could use law enforcement or the military in this way. I then mentioned a recent statement by attorney Peter Ticktin, one of Trump’s advisers. When someone told Ticktin that there would be riots if Trump attempted a coup, Ticktin replied, “Our armed forces are a lot bigger than they are.” Levitt called that a fantasy. Does Ticktin have a point, logistically speaking?

Levitsky: I am not sure what “logistically speaking” means.

Rozsa: If the armed forces are much larger than the forces that could oppose them, could they ultimately carry out a coup?

Levitsky: There is a non-zero chance that they could. I consider it relatively unlikely because they would have to accomplish two things. First, they would have to persuade the military to participate in egregiously and openly anti-democratic conduct. They might be able to do that, but it is not certain that the military would comply.

Second, repression is very difficult, particularly when the government is unpopular and there is no broadly perceived crisis. In the aftermath of something like September 11, if the country were at war, if there were a genuine subversive organization, or if Americans were frightened or strongly supported Trump, they would be more likely to tolerate repression.

The current circumstances are unfavorable for repression. Consider what the Trump administration attempted in Minnesota. For a time, the streets of Minneapolis resembled El Salvador in the 1980s, and the effort became a political liability. If the administration could not militarize Minneapolis in January 2026, I think a national effort would probably fail.

The role of media and Republican elites

Rozsa: I hope you are right, but I want to play devil’s advocate. Many Americans live in an information ecosystem that could reduce public opposition. After January 6, I repeatedly heard that Trump’s political career was over because he had attempted a coup. Some right-wing media outlets initially criticized him. The far-right outlets then supported his efforts to distort what had happened, and more mainstream conservative outlets followed, either downplaying January 6 or contributing to that distortion. By the 2024 election, an event once viewed as disqualifying was no longer an obstacle to his reelection.

What would prevent CNN, which is soon expected to be taken over by a pro-Trump family, Fox News and other conservative outlets from creating their own version of events around a coup attempt and reducing the backlash?

Levitsky: I accept your point about January 6 and the reaction of political elites. After the initial shock faded, within two or three days, Republican politicians assessed the political situation. The elite abdication that followed was shocking, and it was costly. The reason we have Trump today, and the reason we face this threat, is precisely the dynamic you described: elites decided to look the other way.

Could it happen again? The key issue is the behavior of Republican elites, which was decisive during the 2021–2024 period. Almost all Republican elites eventually fell into line. A few broke with the party for several weeks, but they returned. Those who did not, such as Liz Cheney, were purged.

The unified Republican message—that January 6 was acceptable or justified and that the election might have been unfair—allowed the myth to persist and Trump to remain politically viable. One thing to watch is how Republican leaders respond to a new coup attempt. If Republican politicians broadly support, accept or remain silent about it, the situation will be worse. If several leading Republicans speak out, the country will be in a better position.

Even so, Trump has less support within his own coalition than he did in 2021. The support is weaker and thinner. The right-wing media ecosystem is real, but it represents about one-third of the country. That portion of the population may mobilize for or support a coup attempt, and much of the MAGA base might support it. But Fox News lying about a coup would not determine majority public opinion in the United States.

Rozsa: CNN could also lie about it now that it has been purchased by the Ellisons.

Levitsky: CNN might lie about it. We do not know that.

Rozsa: I think it will. I think Ellison has made his position clear.

Levitsky: Ellison wants to make money in the medium term. With Trump this weak, betting on a coup would be a very risky business decision.

Rozsa: It is not only Republicans who would need to cooperate. Jacob Weisberg wrote Profiles in Cowardice about people outside that coalition who participated for transactional reasons, including Jeff Bezos and the head of the law firm Paul, Weiss. The idea that only a sucker sacrifices principle, while a smart person follows power, could also facilitate a coup. What do you think?

Levitsky: I think you are misreading the current balance of power. This is not December 2024, nor January or February 2025. Trump is politically weakened and in a political corner. I am as dismayed as Weisberg by the conduct of Paul, Weiss, universities and Jeff Bezos. But those people are making a different calculation now.

Joining the Trump train as it descends into chaos is a much riskier decision. It turned out to be a poor decision in early 2025. The law firms and universities that cooperated are not better off for having appeased Trump than those that ultimately resisted. As Weisberg explains in his book, there was a logic to their actions, although it was not an admirable logic from the perspective of someone who cares about democracy.

I do not think that logic exists anymore. For someone thinking about making money over the next two years, supporting a coup led by an unpopular person would be irrational. It would be an extremely high-risk decision.

Legal and bureaucratic efforts to reject election results

Rozsa: Suppose Trump cannot overturn the results through physical force and his frivolous litigation fails. He could use the bureaucracy to have elected Democrats rejected. One possibility would involve election administrators embedded in positions responsible for administration and certification who believe in the Big Lie. Another would be persuading Speaker Mike Johnson or Senate Majority Leader John Thune to reject Democratic victories when the results are presented to Congress in 2027. What do you think of those possibilities?

Levitsky: There has been discussion in my field about placing election deniers in local election administrations. To some extent, that has happened, but I do not think it reached the scale supporters hoped for or people like me initially feared. Looking at this administration’s war efforts, tariff efforts and DOGE efforts, it is difficult to imagine that it could execute an extraordinary, coordinated operation of that kind.

The Johnson—or Thune—option is more credible. It turns out to be entirely legal. If Republican candidates allege fraud and Johnson can point to a “contested election,” he may have the power to decide who receives the seat. Based on his conduct, I think he would do so.

If control of Congress depended on three, four or five seats, I would be very concerned. A Democratic landslide would make that less likely and more difficult. We should be grateful that Trump is so unpopular that Republicans are performing so poorly in the election. If the election were very close, I would be far more worried. I am somewhat less concerned because I do not think the balance will depend on two or three seats. I think it will be more than that.

Rozsa: When I asked Professor Levitt the same question, he said, “The key moment isn’t anything that Mike Johnson has a part in. The key moment is who’s put on the roll of potential House members when at noon the House dissolves as a body. At 12:01, there is no House. There is no Speaker Johnson. He’s just a dude. The Clerk of the House is the person who controls the roll. The Clerk of the House has a non-discretionary, very clear statutory duty to recognize the potential members who show up with certificates of election from their states, the things that the state officials have certified.” Do you agree?

Levitsky: I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about that issue to say. I have no opinion. I do not know.

Rozsa: If it appeared that Speaker Johnson was considering supporting Trump’s coup attempt, could Democrats persuade several anti-Trump Republicans in the House to hold an early election and replace Johnson with someone who would not cooperate?

Levitsky: I think that is a relatively likely scenario. Because Trump is so unpopular and an attempted coup would also be so unpopular, there is uncertainty, but I think Democrats would have a good chance of finding a handful of Republicans. It would not take many votes to remove Johnson.

Rozsa: My concern is that Republican media would pressure them so heavily that they would ultimately act cowardly and follow the party line.

Levitsky: That is possible. But given the current balance of public opinion and political strength—and, in part, Trump’s age and physical condition—it is difficult to bet on Trumpism in the medium term. It is much more difficult than it was a year and a quarter ago.

The broader consequences for American democracy

Rozsa: What does it say about the health of American democracy that these worst-case scenarios are even plausible? I have followed politics since I was a teenager in the late 1990s and covered it professionally since the 2012 election. In my lifetime, there had never been a serious threat to democratic institutions. Based on my research into American history, the closest analogy may be the 1860 presidential election, which led to the Civil War. Even then, people did not appear to question whether Abraham Lincoln had been legitimately elected; they opposed his victory because they believed he would limit the expansion of slavery. What does it say about democracy today that these scenarios are possible?

Levitsky: In the terminology of political science, it means that the United States is, at best, an unconsolidated democracy. I have argued that the United States has moved into a form of mild competitive authoritarianism under Trump 2.0. I do not believe the current regime is fully democratic. Even those who do not think Trump’s abuses are sufficient to say democracy has been lost would agree that the United States has become what political scientists call an unconsolidated democracy.

My primary field is Latin American politics, and I have studied political regimes in the region for many years. I was taught that democracies in countries such as Peru and Argentina were unconsolidated because powerful actors could not always be expected to follow the rules. There was no certainty that everyone was committed to democratic procedures.

For many years, the United States was held up as an example of a consolidated democracy in which everyone could be expected to follow democratic rules. Elections could be assumed to be free and fair, and both political actors and the government could be expected to follow the rules. The outcome of an election could be uncertain, but the procedures were not.

That certainty has disappeared, particularly since the 2020 election and amid the current discussion of elections. Even if the probability of a coup is relatively low, there is substantial uncertainty about whether an election will be fair, whether the government will accept the results, and whether officials will try to manipulate the outcome afterward.

That uncertainty is a classic sign of an unconsolidated, unstable democracy. It distinguishes the United States from established democracies in Europe and Canada and makes it more comparable to unstable democracies in Latin America and elsewhere.

Rozsa: Have any unstable democracies in Latin America returned to being consolidated democracies?

Levitsky: Yes, although it often happens after they pass through a period of authoritarian rule. Argentine democracy was considered unconsolidated in the 1980s, when there were several coup attempts. Today, it is considered a consolidated democracy.

Brazil may not be a perfect example because it faced a similar challenge involving Jair Bolsonaro in 2022, so it may not be fully consolidated. I think Brazil handled the situation better than the United States did. Argentina, however, is a much more consolidated democracy today than it was in the 1980s.

Source: AlterNet