Trezor CTO Outlines the Uphill Path to Quantum Resistance for Bitcoin Wallets
Key Takeaways
- •SHRINCS, proposed late last year by Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and cryptographer Mikhail Kudinov, is the community's leading candidate for a post-quantum signature scheme built on hash-based assumptions shared with SHA-256.
- •Stateful signatures in SHRINCS are about 10 times smaller than stateless ones, but reusing them beyond a signing budget can reveal enough cryptographic information for an attacker to forge a user's signature and steal funds.
- •Trezor is considering making the larger, safer stateless signatures the default for all users while restricting the riskier stateful option to advanced settings, because state tracking should not be the user's responsibility.
- •Hardware wallet devices themselves require physical upgrades, since most use quantum-vulnerable cryptography for firmware and device authentication, and Trezor is already shipping the Trezor Safe 7 with post-quantum support for wallet authentication.
- •Sušánka warned developers not to delay offering migration options, as Bitcoin's consensus process for signature changes has historically taken years and migrating potentially millions of users will require time and compromises.

Trezor is preparing for the user-experience challenges that a post-quantum Bitcoin would create for hardware wallet makers, according to the company's chief technology officer, Tomáš Sušánka. The concern centers on SHRINCS, the community's leading candidate for a post-quantum signature scheme, which lets users transact with efficient "stateful" signatures that can expose funds to theft if they are reused beyond a signing budget. To reduce that risk, Trezor is considering making larger, safer "stateless" signatures the default and hiding the riskier stateful option behind advanced settings.
Bitcoin custody has always involved some degree of risk, but wallet manufacturers like Trezor—which build physical devices designed to keep a user's private keys secure offline—are getting ready for a post-quantum world in which new challenges arise. That preparation matters because Bitcoin's signatures currently rely on elliptic-curve cryptography, which a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break, and the shift to quantum-resistant alternatives will touch everything from the network's protocol rules to the hardware sitting on users' desks.
How SHRINCS works
SHRINCS, proposed late last year by Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and cryptographer Mikhail Kudinov, centers on a composite hash-based approach: users can make transactions using either stateful signatures or stateless signatures.
Stateless signatures are quite large—potentially affecting fees, signature speed, and other efficiency metrics—but they are safe to reuse. Smaller, more efficient stateful signatures carry serious security risks when reused beyond a particular signing budget. The stateful component of SHRINCS is made up of a tree of one-time signatures, and if these keys are accidentally used more than once, enough cryptographic information is revealed for someone else to forge that user's signature and effectively steal funds.
If Bitcoin successfully adopts SHRINCS, maintaining a meticulous count of the wallet's state will become a critical responsibility for wallet developers, with plenty of potential edge-case security risks.
"You're giving them an option to mess up," Sušánka said during a recent episode of MARA Foundation TV, in reference to state tracking. "It's our job to make it in a secure way, right? It shouldn't be the user's job."
To mitigate this risk, Trezor is weighing options for how to support secure UX in a post-quantum world. Sušánka said the company is considering making the heavier, slower stateless signatures the default setting for all users, tucking the riskier stateful option behind an advanced settings wall.
While he recognizes that SHRINCS may be the conservative cryptographic choice because it relies on the same cryptographic assumptions as SHA-256, Sušánka said he is "kind of torn on the topic because maintaining the state is a burden." SHA-256 is the same hash function that secures Bitcoin's proof-of-work mining, meaning the scheme would rest on cryptographic assumptions the network already depends on.
"For example, you can have two Trezors with the same recovery seed. How do you share the state between those two? You really don't," he added.
"That being said, as it is with everything, this is about trade-offs," Sušánka continued. "The [stateful] signatures are 10 times smaller ... That makes a big difference. So, I just don't want to throw it off the table completely."
Devices need upgrades too
While many in the community are focused on Bitcoin's migration path to post-quantum addresses and signatures, Sušánka noted that hardware wallet devices themselves will also need to be physically updated for full quantum protection. Most signing devices use quantum-vulnerable cryptography for hardware-specific security functions, such as firmware and device authentication.
Users who want to ensure their devices are secure in a post-quantum world will need "quantum-ready" devices—that is, devices that use post-quantum cryptography for device and firmware authentication as well.
In anticipation of these needs, Trezor is already shipping products like the Trezor Safe 7, which supports post-quantum cryptography for wallet authentication processes. Transactions made on these devices will only be quantum-secure once Bitcoin itself upgrades to post-quantum security, however. Any change to Bitcoin's signature rules would need to clear the network's consensus process, and protocol upgrades of comparable scope have historically taken years to move from proposal to activation.
That said, Sušánka warned developers not to wait too long to give users migration options, as he believes the migration of potentially millions of users will take time.
"People should be ready to make compromises," Sušánka said. "If we're all going to be very strict on what can and cannot be done, we're not going to get anywhere."
André Beganski is a Senior Content Manager at MARA Foundation, producing content on topics including the intersection of quantum computing and cryptography. He has previously worked for Decrypt.