Both Sides Are Losing This War: CIA Director's Moscow Visit Underscores Unpredictable Russia-Ukraine Escalation
Key Takeaways
- •CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Moscow last week to meet with the heads of Russian intelligence amid escalating tensions in the Russia-Ukraine war.
- •Russian attacks on Black Sea shipping have driven wheat and corn prices up roughly 13% over the past six weeks, while European natural gas prices reached their highest levels since early 2023.
- •Former Ukrainian defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov told the Financial Times that Ukraine is gradually losing the war and is seeking investor backing for a defense technology fund focused on battlefield robotics, interceptor drones, and AI-enabled missiles.
- •Turkey summoned Ukraine's ambassador over attacks on Turkish-operated vessels in the Black Sea, straining relations with the country that controls the Bosphorus and brokered earlier grain deals.
- •The US announced the creation of North American Blue Energy Partners, giving the Department of War a 35% equity stake and effective control of 65 billion barrels of Venezuela's proven oil reserves, while the EPA plans expanded biofuel blending exemptions that could reduce demand for US corn.

Both Sides Are Losing This War
By Jacob Shapiro
The last time a CIA director flew to Moscow (that we know of) was in November 2021, when then-director William Burns traveled there to warn Russia against invading Ukraine. We know how that turned out. John Ratcliffe made the trip last week, reportedly to meet with the heads of Russian intelligence. The war he is trying to discuss has become the one thing in the world that nobody can price.
The Situation
CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow last week takes place amid considerable and unpredictable escalation in the Russia-Ukraine war. US intelligence has warned that Russia might attack a NATO country in the future. In recent months, Russia has stepped up "gray-zone" attacks—including drone incursions, cyberattacks, and acts of sabotage—across Europe. (When this column previously suggested that external forces benefited from the migrant incursion at Ceuta, Russia was the country in mind.)
Russia has also intensified its attacks in the Black Sea, striking ports, vessels, and trucks. The Black Sea has served as Ukraine's main agricultural export corridor since a UN- and Turkish-brokered grain deal in 2022—and since that deal collapsed in 2023, Ukraine has relied on a unilateral shipping lane hugging the coastlines of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, making any disruption to the corridor immediately consequential for world grain supply. The resulting drop in grain exports has pushed wheat and corn prices up roughly 13% over the last six weeks and injected significant uncertainty into the sunflower market, a market in which Ukraine is one of the world's largest exporters. The combination of Russian aggression and the intermittent closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven European natural gas prices to their highest levels since early 2023—and winter is coming, a season in which Europe has grown dependent on liquefied natural gas imports since the loss of Russian pipeline gas.
Equal and Opposite
It has been a difficult year for Russia. This column argued in June that the Russian economy was buckling. Ukraine flipped the narrative on the battlefield, using drone strikes on everything from Russian oil refineries to warehouses for Russia's version of Amazon (Wildberries) to bring the costs of the war home to the elites of Moscow and St. Petersburg. But every action produces an equal and opposite reaction, and Russia is fighting back. As Ukrainian attacks have increased, so have Russian retaliations, with Russia's Defense Ministry warning that it is planning "massive strikes" on Ukraine's energy infrastructure in the coming days.
Part of the success of Russia's attacks on Ukraine in August is attributable to critical shortages of Patriot interceptors, which Ukraine uses to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles. (The Pentagon denies these shortages despite all evidence to the contrary.) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, faces threats to his legitimacy after firing his popular defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, and amid mass protests, calls for elections, and corruption scandals involving officials high up in his government. Over the weekend, Turkey summoned Ukraine's ambassador over attacks on Turkish-operated vessels in the Black Sea, putting Ukraine at odds with a powerful force in the region—one that controls the Bosphorus, the strait through which all Black Sea maritime traffic must pass, and that brokered the earlier grain deals.
Both sides are losing this war. Neither can see a clear path to its strategic objectives. Even so, the pressure has shifted in recent months toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has generated plenty of stories about the potential use of nuclear weapons or incursions into NATO countries. NATO may be feckless and strategically adrift, but an assault on a member state would pull European countries into the fray under the alliance's Article 5 mutual-defense commitment. And if mutually assured destruction doesn't hold, we all have bigger problems than whether this analysis is right.
A Slow, Grinding Conflict
More likely is that Putin is fighting the same war he has been fighting since his 2022 blitzkrieg toward Kyiv failed: a slow, grinding conflict in which Russia makes the economics of the war impossible for Ukraine and exhausting for Europe, so that a settlement is ultimately reached on his maximalist terms. Russian history is littered with enemies who simply could not outsuffer Russia on Eurasian turf, and Putin is betting on that formula once more.
The aforementioned Fedorov agrees. Credited as the brainchild behind Ukraine's innovative and effective use of drones to attack Russia, Fedorov told the Financial Times earlier this week that Ukraine is "gradually, slowing losing the war." This is the same Fedorov who, as defense minister, declared that Ukraine had the upper hand. But wars are dynamic, and Russia is surely studying Ukraine's tactics—with far greater resources than Ukraine possesses.
Fedorov is reportedly drumming up investor interest in a defense technology fund to "write a new history of the war." The three areas he believes Ukraine must dominate next: battlefield robotics (Kyiv has limited and inferior manpower relative to Russia), cheap high-speed interceptor drones, and similarly cheap AI-enabled missiles. The precision-guided munitions of the 21st century will have brains, apparently. That is also the only way Ukraine can hope to "win" the war, and the only tactic that has ever beaten Russia's ability to suffer. The US won the Cold War because it out-innovated the Soviets even as the latter were willing to outsuffer the consumer-driven Americans.
Zero-Sum
The Russia-Ukraine war has reached a dynamic and unpredictable moment. This is not like the ongoing US-Iran war in the Middle East, which is becoming a farce. The US is running out of munitions, and the price of oil and its impact on inflation limit the extent and magnitude of US strikes. Iran has used the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and, in doing so, set off a race to build infrastructure around it—and a global race to source alternate supply. That war will keep moving markets, but its impacts are rangebound and the scenarios are clear: Iran will control a Strait that matters less every year and will allow passage only to ships from countries friendly to Iran. The multipolar world of discrete spheres of influence, made manifest.
Where the Russia-Ukraine war goes from here is far less certain, and its potential impacts are not priced in because they are impossible to see clearly. If Turkey can secure a grain deal 2.0—echoing its role in the 2022 agreement that once moved tens of millions of tons of grain—and Ratcliffe's warnings are heeded, agricultural commodities might pull back and the Black Sea might become relatively quiet once more. Or Moscow and Kyiv may be stuck on an escalatory ladder, which—on top of a super El Niño and the ongoing Hormuz drama—would continue to push up the prices of everything from oil to food, with nothing the Fed, the CIA director, or anyone else can do about it. (The Turkish Chamber of Shipping has voiced concern that Turkish shipping companies might go bankrupt if the situation continues.)
The US and Iran, and their respective regimes, will still exist whenever the two sides decide it is time to stop fighting; the squabble now is over the details. The Russia-Ukraine war, by contrast, is zero-sum. Stalemate is not an option. Russia and Ukraine can accept each other's survival only on terms the other cannot give. So they will go on trying to outsuffer and out-innovate each other—and while it is the everyday Russian and Ukrainian who bears the greatest cost, the cost to the rest of the world, at the pump, the grocery store, and on the heating bill, will be felt for as many more winters as it takes.
Blind Spot
Last Friday, the US announced what President Trump called "the biggest oil deal in the world." This past Monday, the White House followed up with details: the creation of a company called North American Blue Energy Partners, in which the US Department of War will take a 35% equity stake. Though the scheme is of questionable legality, for now the Trump Administration has effectively seized control of 65 billion barrels of Venezuela's proven oil reserves.
This is old-fashioned imperialism: a great power seizing control of an asset because it wants it and because it can. Separately but relatedly, Venezuela is reportedly considering whether to quit OPEC—which is especially ironic for anyone who knows the history. OPEC was the brainchild of a Venezuelan official who modeled the idea on the Texas Railroad Commission, which controlled how much oil producers were allowed to pump until 1972, when US energy demands exceeded supply.
Also this past Monday, Reuters reported that the US EPA will approve an expanded volume of exemptions for US oil refiners from biofuel blending requirements—meaning they will be allowed to refine more product without blending in as much corn-based ethanol, theoretically lowering gasoline prices while undercutting demand for US corn. Roughly a third of the US corn crop typically goes toward ethanol production, so blending waivers strike directly at farm-state demand. If it happens, it would be the second major blow to US farmers, who overwhelmingly backed the president in the last election, after the White House said it was quadrupling beef imports from Argentina.
The US government is understandably trying to get a handle on consumer prices heading into the November midterms: that is what good populists do. Bread and circuses—keep the price of food and fuel down, hold gladiatorial UFC matches on the White House lawn. Football season is near. Never mind that Venezuelan oil cannot fill the gap anytime soon, or the questionable legality behind such a move, or the parts of the electorate that will suffer to keep those prices low.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's interventions in the bond market are of a similar nature: Sisyphean and, at best, temporary moves to keep prices down. The tone of the Fed's meetings in Jackson Hole was one of relative hawkishness, but the economy is booming because of data centers—not because the US consumer is healthy, and not because affordability is getting any better. This is one of those takes the author hopes to be wrong about, because the political consequences of being right will not be pleasant.
About the Author
Jacob Shapiro is an independent geopolitical analyst who helps investors and executive teams understand how a multipolar world is reshaping markets and strategy. He provides bespoke research, private briefings, and keynote presentations for clients ranging from investment firms to corporate leadership teams. He publishes his free newsletter, The World Isn't Ending, at Mauldin Economics and hosts The Jacob Shapiro Podcast, where he conducts long-form interviews on geopolitics, markets, and global risk. He lives in New Orleans with his wife and two daughters.
Source: GoldSeek