With Russian infrastructure being pummeled by Ukrainian drones, the Kremlin is hoping to sustain its war effort in Ukraine by deepening defense cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That effort would depend not only on whether Astana and Tashkent are willing to cooperate, but also on whether they are prepared to take on the diplomatic and financial risks that could follow.

Russia appears to be mainly interested in outsourcing the manufacture of weapons and establishing assembly lines and maintenance facilities in the Central Asian countries, putting them beyond the reach of Ukrainian drones, according to a report published by RFE/RL.

“Ukraine has certainly become more bold in its actions, but it will not want to launch drone strikes on Kazakhstani territory,” defense analyst Derek Bisaccio told RFE/RL’s Central Asian service. “That would be seen there as a serious escalation.”

A shift in arms production from Russia to Central Asia would mark a sharp change in regional dynamics. For most of the post-Soviet era, Russia was the main supplier of weapons to Central Asian states. Moscow’s near-monopoly on the regional arms market began to erode in 2022, when the Kremlin launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Now, Kyiv’s successful drone campaign appears to be forcing Russia to consider becoming an arms importer rather than an exporter.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan already host facilities capable of keeping Russian equipment in service, including the Semey Engineering plant and Almaty’s Aircraft Repair Plant in Kazakhstan, as well as the Chirchik Aircraft Repair Plant in Uzbekistan. That existing industrial base may make them relevant to Moscow’s plans, but it also means any expansion would unfold in countries that have their own interest in preserving room to maneuver between Russia and the West.

For Kazakh and Uzbek leaders, the difficulties of expanding defense cooperation with Russia may well outweigh the benefits. One concern is that such a move could expose both countries to sweeping secondary sanctions from the United States and European Union.

Asked about the issue by RFE/RL, a Kazakh Defense Ministry official gave no firm answer, saying the matter was still under review. Uzbek authorities did not comment. Pavel Baev, a regional expert at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), told RFE/RL that he saw little incentive for Astana and Tashkent to embrace what he called Moscow’s “less-than-smart plan.”

Lost in the discussion of what would amount to the offshoring of Russia’s military-industrial complex is the question of how Moscow would pay for it.

The war has strained Russian state finances and reduced the country’s ability to fund large-scale projects. Russia has already had to delay major projects in Central Asia, including the construction of nuclear power plants, because of cash-flow problems at the state-controlled nuclear company Rosatom. Russian state-controlled entities have also seen contracts to build power plants in Kazakhstan cancelled because of financing troubles.

The shortage of resources has not stopped Russia from trying to present an image of normalcy. On August 18, the Russian state-aligned outlet Sputnik Kyrgyzstan reported that an entity called the Russia-Kyrgyzstan Development Fund (RKDF) was ready to finance $660 million in infrastructure projects to narrow Kyrgyzstan’s electricity deficit. The report did not explain how the projects would be funded.

The RKDF was created in 2014 under the auspices of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union to “promote economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, to modernize and develop the Kyrgyz economy” with the aim of promoting “Eurasian economic integration.” The fund’s reported capitalization in 2025 was $574 million.

By Eurasianet