NewsCryptoHacker Mints $2.7 Million in Crypto as Initia Halts Blockchain and Rollups

Hacker Mints $2.7 Million in Crypto as Initia Halts Blockchain and Rollups

Author: NFTENEX·

Key Takeaways

  • •An attacker exploited a previously unknown Day 0 bug in Initia's MoveVM implementation on CosmosSDK, allowing tokens to be minted directly on the Initia Layer 1 outside normal issuance controls.
  • •The hacker minted and bridged out approximately $2.7 million in AUSD, ETH, and USDC before validators halted the entire network, including all rollups.
  • •Co-founder Ezaan Mangalji stated that native INIT tokens were not affected by the vulnerability, while South Korean exchange Upbit suspended INIT deposits and withdrawals.
  • •Stablecoin issuer Agora committed to freezing AUSD held at hacker-linked addresses on chains where its smart contracts are deployed, as it has no contracts on Initia itself.
  • •INIT traded at $0.132268, down 1.83% over 24 hours, with roughly $33.45 million in trading volume exceeding its approximately $27.9 million market capitalization.
Hacker Mints $2.7 Million in Crypto as Initia Halts Blockchain and Rollups

A hacker exploited a previously unknown bug in Initia's blockchain infrastructure on October 23, 2026, minting and bridging out roughly $2.7 million in digital assets before the network's validators halted the chain entirely, freezing all transactions across its Layer 1 and connected rollups.

Initia is a Cosmos SDK-based network that pairs a Layer 1 blockchain with an interconnected rollup framework, executing smart contracts through the Move virtual machine (MoveVM), the runtime for the Move programming language, originally developed for Meta's Diem project and designed around strict rules for handling digital assets. Move has since been adopted by other layer 1, including Aptos and Sui, which each run their own implementations of the virtual machine.

How the Initia Incident Unfolded

Initia's official account confirmed that, as of 3:41:30 PM UTC on October 23, its L1 and rollups had been halted in response to a security incident. The pause was a deliberate defensive measure rather than a network crash, and it stopped all on-chain activity while the team investigated the scope of the breach.

The Reported $2.7 Million Minting Event

Co-founder Ezaan Mangalji attributed the incident to a Day 0 bug in Initia's MoveVM implementation on CosmosSDK. In security terminology, a Day 0 designation refers to a vulnerability that was unknown and unpatched at the time it was exploited, leaving defenders without a ready-made fix. According to Mangalji, the flaw allowed the attacker to mint additional tokens directly on the Initia L1, sidestepping normal issuance controls entirely. Flaws at the execution-layer level are treated with particular urgency because a virtual machine processes every transaction a chain accepts, meaning a defect there can surface in core asset logic rather than in a single application.

to the best of our knowledge so far, this is a Day 0 bug related to Initia's MoveVM on CosmosSDK that allowed the exploiter to mint additional tokens on the Initia L1 but does not apply to native INIT tokens. the attacker was able to mint and bridge out ~$2.7m worth of AUSD,…

— zon 🪢 (@ItsAlwaysZonny) October 23, 2026

Mangalji said the attacker minted and bridged out approximately $2.7 million in AUSD, ETH, and USDC before the chain was paused. The funds left the Initia ecosystem via bridging infrastructure, meaning the attacker had already moved assets to other networks by the time the halt took effect.

Importantly, Mangalji stressed that native INIT tokens were not affected by the described bug. The vulnerability was specific to the MoveVM module's token minting logic, not to the chain's base-layer asset. According to the team's initial statement, the final scope, the total loss figure, and the definitive root cause remain under active investigation.

The Chain Halt and Immediate Status

When Initia's L1 went dark, every rollup built on top of it followed. The halt interrupted transaction processing across the entire Initia ecosystem, affecting any application, bridge, or user with pending activity at the time. The chain remained halted when secondary reporting was published. South Korean exchange Upbit, one of the country's largest crypto trading platforms, also suspended INIT deposits and withdrawals following the incident, reflecting the standard exchange response to a live chain-security event. Exchanges typically suspend support for an asset while its network is offline, because deposits cannot be confirmed during a halt.

This kind of coordinated halt is a legitimate crisis-management tool for Cosmos-based chains, where validators can reach social consensus to stop block production. It prevents further exploit transactions from being processed, but it also means legitimate users cannot move funds until the chain restarts under a patched binary. Because Cosmos SDK networks need a supermajority of validator voting power back online to resume block production, restart timing depends on how quickly validators coordinate on the upgraded software.

What the Halt Means for Initia Users and the Response

Practical Effects on Token Holders and Applications

Any transaction submitted to the Initia L1 during the halt window is effectively suspended. Applications relying on Initia's rollup infrastructure, including any projects using AUSD as a stablecoin layer, could not process user actions while the chain was paused.

Stablecoin issuer Agora moved quickly to contain cross-chain exposure. AUSD is a U.S. dollar-backed stablecoin issued by the company. Agora said it has no smart contracts deployed on Initia itself, and its security team committed to freezing funds linked to hacker addresses that hold AUSD on chains where Agora's smart contracts are deployed.

We're aware of today's security incident on Initia. Agora has no smart contracts deployed on Initia. Our security team has been monitoring the situation and will freeze funds related to hacker addresses that hold AUSD on chains where AUSD/Agora smart contracts are deployed.

— Agora (@withAUSD) October 23, 2026

Agora's response highlights how cross-chain asset issuers can act as a secondary defense layer when a host chain is compromised. By blacklisting attacker addresses at the contract level on other networks, the issuer can effectively strand funds that have already bridged out, reducing the attacker's ability to liquidate stolen assets. This dynamic is a meaningful feature of programmable stablecoin infrastructure that pure on-chain attackers often underestimate.

INIT Token Market Response

INIT serves as the native token of the Initia network, used for transaction fees, staking, and governance. Because the bug targeted non-native assets, INIT holders faced a different risk profile than direct victims of the minting exploit. At the time of the research snapshot, INIT was priced at $0.132268, down 1.83% over 24 hours, with approximately $33.45 million in 24-hour trading volume against a market capitalization of roughly $27.9 million. The 24-hour volume figure exceeding the total market cap indicates unusually elevated turnover, consistent with a security-event sell-off and reactive trading rather than ordinary liquidity patterns.

The broader Crypto Fear & Greed Index stood at 51 (Neutral) at the time of the snapshot, suggesting the incident had not yet produced a market-wide fear response beyond Initia's own token activity.

Response Milestones to Watch

Initia said it was working with security teams, validators, and exchanges to investigate the full scope of the incident. The key milestones ahead include a confirmed root cause and patch, a coordinated validator upgrade to the patched binary, a supervised chain restart, and a post-incident report reconciling the $2.7 million figure against on-chain evidence. Until an official post-mortem is published, the $2.7 million figure should be treated as an early estimate rather than a final loss number.

Incidents of this type, where a bridge-enabled chain exploit enables rapid asset extraction before a halt, have become a recurring pattern in Cosmos-based infrastructure. A similar cross-chain movement pattern was documented in the Coldcard/THORChain incident, where an attacker used interoperability infrastructure to convert stolen assets before responders could react. The speed of bridging remains a structural challenge that no single protocol can solve unilaterally.

Users and builders with active positions or deployments on Initia should rely exclusively on official announcements from the Initia team before taking any action. Phishing attempts and fake recovery schemes routinely follow high-profile chain halts; treat any unsolicited link or wallet-connection request related to this incident as malicious until verified through Initia's own communication channels. Developers building on Initia's rollup stack or using AUSD as a settlement layer should monitor Agora's official channels for updates on address blacklisting and contract-level protections, similar to what institutional operators managing multi-asset crypto positions routinely track during security events affecting underlying infrastructure.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Cryptocurrency and digital asset markets carry significant risk. Always do your own research before making decisions.