Dark Tanker Transits Dominate Strait of Hormuz Since 14 July
Key Takeaways
- •Since 14 July, 56% of the 102 tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz were operated by non-transparent interests, including sanctioned fleet and ghost fleet vessels.
- •Iran's proposed shipping corridor agreement with Oman remains unconfirmed and faces opposition from the United States and the IMO over potential transit fees.
- •Arabian Gulf export routes continued to command the highest freight earnings, with MEG–Singapore reaching approximately $502,000 per day as of 6 August.
- •VLCC fleet utilization recovered to 48.4% by 21 July 2026, the highest reading of the year and roughly nine percentage points above the three-year seasonal average.
- •The East of Suez ballast-to-laden VLCC ratio rose sharply from approximately 1.0 to 1.5 between mid-July and early August, indicating vessel availability increased faster than laden employment.

Dark Tanker Transits Dominate Strait of Hormuz Since 14 July
Since 14 July, a majority of tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world's most critical maritime oil chokepoints, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption routinely passes — have been conducted by vessels operating without transparent ownership or tracking. Of 102 total transits recorded, 56% were operated by non-transparent interests — comprising 29 sanctioned fleet vessels, 17 under opaque ownership, and 11 ghost fleet vessels — while 44% were controlled by named, transparent owners.
East-to-west crossings totalled 55, compared with 47 in the opposite direction, reflecting substantial traffic volumes in both directions. However, vessel routing was heavily concentrated along the Iranian side of the Strait, where 45 transits were identified. Only four were confirmed on the Omani lane. The remaining 53 crossings could not be verified because AIS transmissions — the automatic vessel tracking system required under international maritime safety regulations — were unavailable for much or all of the passage.
Of the 102 transits recorded since 14 July, 62% were classified as dark, with crude oil transits showing a higher dark rate (79%) than clean products (50%).
Iran–Oman Route Agreement: Not Yet a Pathway
On 5 August, Iran announced that it had reached an understanding with Oman on the geographic coordinates of a proposed shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz. Under the proposed arrangement, inbound traffic would be routed along the Iranian side and outbound traffic along the Omani side. According to Iranian officials, a joint statement covering the technical, legal, security, and environmental framework is being finalised.
However, the proposed routing arrangements and any associated service fee mechanism remain unconfirmed and continue to face significant legal and commercial obstacles. The United States has publicly opposed any transit fees, while the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has maintained that international law provides no basis for discriminatory transit charges in the Strait of Hormuz. The transit passage regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for unimpeded navigation through international straits such as Hormuz, and the IMO's position reflects that framework.
Adding to the uncertainty, an Iranian parliamentary committee is reviewing a preliminary bill that would prohibit U.S., Israeli, and other "hostile" vessels from transiting the Strait and would impose fines of up to 20% of cargo value for violations. The draft legislation remains under expert review and has not been adopted.
Taken together, these developments indicate that the regulatory and legal environment for commercial shipping through the Strait remains uncertain, limiting the prospects for a meaningful recovery in vessel transits until greater clarity emerges.
Freight: East vs West of Suez
As of 6 August, the East–West earnings gap remained pronounced. Arabian Gulf export routes continued to post the highest returns, with MEG–China (TD3C) at approximately $481,000/day, up $58,000 week-over-week, and MEG–Singapore (TD2) at around $502,000/day, up $44,000. MEG–Med Suezmax (TD23) was almost unchanged at about $320,000/day. The TD routes are standardised tanker freight benchmarks published by the Baltic Exchange and widely used across the shipping industry for pricing reference.
Across the Atlantic basin, most benchmark routes eased over the week. The Black Sea–Mediterranean Suezmax route (TD6) was the only major route to strengthen, reaching approximately $377,000/day (+$59,000). US Gulf–China (TD22) stood at about $119,000/day (−$9,000), West Africa–China (TD15) at $107,000/day (−$10,000), Caribbean and East Coast Mexico Aframaxes at $89,000–$95,000/day (−$24,000 to −$27,000), and West Africa and Guyana Suezmaxes (TD20, TD27) at $71,000–$74,000/day (−$29,000).
VLCC Fleet Utilisation and Asset Values
VLCC fleet utilisation followed two distinct phases in 2026. After remaining within a 42–46% range during the first quarter, utilisation weakened through the second quarter, reaching a year-to-date low of 32% in mid-April. It then recovered to 48.4% by 21 July — the highest reading of the year and approximately nine percentage points above both the three-year seasonal average (39%) and the equivalent level in 2025 (39%).
Asset values followed a different trajectory. Nearly 80% of the year's appreciation had already been recorded by March, well before fleet utilisation reached its July high. Five-year-old VLCC values increased from $118 million at end-2025 to $138 million by March and have since edged higher to approximately $143 million. Ten-year-old values rose from $88 million to $110 million before reaching about $113 million.
The stronger appreciation in older tonnage (+29% versus +21% for five-year-old vessels) narrowed the price gap between five- and ten-year-old VLCCs from approximately $30 million at end-2025 to around $26 million during February and March. From April onwards, the differential widened steadily, returning to approximately $30 million by July.
Ballast vs Laden: East vs West of Suez
The largest concentration of VLCC ballasters remains east of Suez, with 150 vessels in the Far East and 135 in the Arabian Gulf, compared with a combined 52 across the Americas (25), West Africa (14), and Europe (13). Ballast vessels outnumber laden ships by 96% in the Far East (150 vs 77) and by 150% in the Arabian Gulf (135 vs 54), underscoring the heavier ballast presence in the eastern basin.
West of Suez, fleet balances are considerably closer. The Americas (25 vs 29) and West Africa (14 vs 15) are near parity, while South Africa/Indian Ocean represents the largest western concentration at 64 ballast vessels against 41 laden.
The East of Suez ballast-to-laden ratio reversed sharply after 14 July, rising from approximately 1.0 to 1.5 by 6 August. Laden VLCCs declined from 344 to 278, while ballasters increased from 351 to 429. Although the ratio had previously reached similar levels in early April, the move since mid-July stands out for its speed, reversing the lower readings seen through late June and early July.
Summary
Three weeks after the renewed blockade, the market continues to exhibit three distinct characteristics: reduced transparency in crude movements through Hormuz, a sustained earnings premium on Arabian Gulf export routes, and secondhand VLCC values that continue to hold close to their first-quarter gains. The increase in the East of Suez ballast-to-laden ratio from around 1.0 to 1.5 indicates that vessel availability has increased more quickly than laden employment in the region. Rather than pointing to a normalisation in trading conditions, the combined evidence suggests that the VLCC market has adapted to a different operating environment, where fleet positioning, freight pricing, and vessel deployment continue to reflect ongoing disruption.
Source: Signal Group via Hellenic Shipping News