A new paper by Brennan and Freiman contends that the standard arguments against laissez-faire capitalism apply, in the authors' words, "in a rather straight way" against laissez-faire democracy — the position that democratic decision-making should itself be left unregulated. The paper, published via Cambridge Core, was highlighted in an October 7, 2026 post on the economics blog Marginal REVOLUTION, run by economists Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok. The authors — political philosophers Jason Brennan, of Georgetown University, and Christopher Freiman — build the case on a consistency claim: however one judges the regulation of markets, the same reasons, they argue, bear on whether democratic decision-making should be left alone.

A "Startling" Asymmetry

According to the authors, the result should be "rather startling, considering that laissez-faire capitalism is widely rejected, yet laissez-faire democracy is widely accepted." Their claim is that all of the typical market-failure arguments — externalities, asymmetric information, principal-agent problems, and behavioral issues — apply to democracy just as they do to unregulated markets. The asymmetry matters because these arguments are typically invoked in only one direction, as grounds for regulating markets rather than for regulating the political process that does the regulating.

Externalities at the Ballot Box

The paper identifies externality problems as the central distinction between markets and politics. Market decisions, the authors write, "are usually and mostly internalized; negative externalities are seen as an anomaly to be corrected." Political decisions, by contrast, "are by nature public."

Brexit serves as their illustrative case. In the UK's 2016 referendum, about 37% of the eligible voting public — and 26% of the entire population of the UK — voted in favour of Brexit, yet the effects of the decision are borne by everyone else: losing voters, eligible voters who abstained, children and other citizens ineligible to vote, future generations, and foreigners. Framed this way, a single ballot is not a purely personal choice but an act whose costs spill over onto others — the defining feature of an externality.

The authors compare the problem to pollution from individual automobile drivers or airline passengers:

We drive too much and pollute too much because we bear the benefits of these actions but pass the costs onto others. Individually we matter little but collectively we matter a great deal. If externality regulation is prima facie justified in the case of pollution, it is prima facie justified in the case of voting.

Democracy Is Already Regulated

Before proposing anything new, Brennan and Freiman observe that "pretty much everyone already accepts some government actions" that can plausibly be understood as regulation of voting or of democratic processes. Some issues are put directly to voters; others are left to elected leaders, judges, and bureaucracies; still others are removed from political consideration entirely. The timing and location of elections, who is permitted to vote and at what age, and who is permitted to run for office are all forms of regulation. Government funding of public education is, in part, a deliberate non-laissez-faire subsidy intended to increase voter competence.

The authors add that many readers are likely comfortable with government regulation of campaign donations, campaign expenditures, and even which kinds of speech are permitted, and that probably almost all readers reject outright markets in votes (Freiman 2014). Each of these arrangements, they argue, is a form of government regulation that already inhibits laissez-faire democracy — which is why the paper treats the question as one of degree rather than of principle.

Possible Regulations

In sketching what further regulation of democracy might look like, the authors stipulate, for the sake of argument, universal and equal suffrage — no weighted votes and no knowledge tests for voting eligibility. Possibilities they raise include:

• paying citizens to pass a voluntary civics exam;
• tracking campaign promises and fining deceptive claims;
• regulating political advertisements more like drug advertisements; and
• requiring supermajorities for certain decisions.

The paper elaborates on each of these proposals in greater detail.

The Laissez-Faire Rejoinder

The Marginal REVOLUTION post closes by anticipating a likely objection: that regulations of this kind would be captured by special interests, administered by biased officials, or produce unintended consequences. The response, the post suggests, cuts in a familiar direction: "Indeed, welcome to the argument for laissez-faire." That closing line points to the symmetry at the heart of the paper: objections to market regulation mirror objections to regulating democracy, so a consistent position has to explain why the same arguments settle one question and not the other.

Source: Marginal REVOLUTION, "Against Laissez-Faire Democracy," October 7, 2026. Original post.