NewsCryptoXRP Ledger's proposed AMM V2 could improve trading without boosting token demand

XRP Ledger's proposed AMM V2 could improve trading without boosting token demand

Author: CryptoNewsNet·

Key Takeaways

  • •The proposed AMM Swappable Curves draft would allow XRPL pool creators to choose among StableSwap, concentrated liquidity, and binned liquidity models, aiming to increase executable depth per unit of capital.
  • •Snapshot data from Nov. 15 showed the RLUSD/USDC pool holding roughly $50,133 in total, while the XRP/RLUSD pool held approximately 1.94 million XRP against 1.88 million RLUSD.
  • •AMM V2 remains proposed work, with next steps including rebasing and reopening the implementation pull request, followed by review and audit, and activation requiring validator approval.
  • •The XRP Ledger Foundation's Nov. 4 assessment stated that no issuer, wallet, exchange, or DEX front end had publicly committed to using the proposed pools.
  • •Fee income would belong to liquidity providers rather than all XRP holders, and larger pool balances alone could reflect capital moved from elsewhere rather than demonstrated fresh holding demand.
XRP Ledger's proposed AMM V2 could improve trading without boosting token demand

The XRP Ledger's proposed AMM V2 overhaul would allow the creators of automated trading pools to choose how those pools price trades, potentially giving traders more usable liquidity from the same deposit. For $XRP holders, the potential benefits are better execution and new ways to provide liquidity; any additional demand to hold the token would depend on which assets and routes ultimately attract capital.

That distinction is already visible in today's pools. XRPSCAN responses retrieved at 13:15 UTC on Nov. 15 showed roughly 25,065 of Ripple's dollar stablecoin $RLUSD and 25,068 of Circle's $USDC in the $RLUSD / $USDC pool — about $50,133 in total if both stablecoins are valued at $1. The $XRP / $RLUSD pool held approximately 1.94 million $XRP against 1.88 million $RLUSD.

These figures are reserve snapshots, not the amounts a trader could exchange at an unchanged price. They also illustrate two different inventory profiles: the first pair holds two stablecoins, while the second holds $XRP itself.

As market context, CryptoSlate's $XRP page displayed $0.97 when retrieved at 13:15 UTC on Nov. 15, with market data marked as updated eight minutes earlier.

More depth, different inventory needs

An automated market maker (AMM) lets users trade against a pool whose prices follow a formula, and XRPL's current design uses a constant-product-style curve. That liquidity supports trading across a broad price range, even when the paired assets usually trade close to one another.

The AMM Swappable Curves draft proposes alternatives. StableSwap would concentrate effective depth near the expected relationship between correlated assets, such as two dollar stablecoins. Concentrated liquidity would let providers allocate capital within chosen price ranges. Binned liquidity would place assets at discrete fixed prices, with execution moving to another price once a funded bin is exhausted.

The economic aim is more executable depth per unit of capital. A stablecoin pool could serve trades near parity with less money spread across distant prices, and a provider choosing a narrower range could make the same deposit more useful for as long as that range remains active. The size of any trading improvement, however, would depend on funding, price ranges, fees, trade size, and whether correlated assets stay close in value.

Routing matters as much as the curve. XRPL already combines AMMs and order books, and the draft would compare curve offers at each routing step using their actual output after fees at the offer's size, rather than choosing solely by the displayed marginal price. Any execution comparison must therefore include order-book liquidity and alternative routes, not just these two pools.

A more efficient direct $RLUSD / $USDC pool could improve stablecoin execution without holding $XRP as either trading asset. Users would still face $XRP transaction costs and any applicable account or trust-line reserve requirements, which are separate from funding $XRP inventory in a trading pair. Current AMM ledger entries carry reserve exemptions, but those exemptions do not automatically extend to the new position entries proposed for AMM V2.

A pair involving $XRP creates a different opportunity because its inventory includes $XRP. Even there, capital efficiency cuts both ways: less $XRP could support a given amount of executable depth, while a larger, more active market could attract enough providers to raise aggregate deposits. Higher turnover alone would not distinguish between those outcomes, since the same inventory can support repeated trades. A stronger holding-demand case would require persistent additional $XRP balances across relevant pools and routes, with deposits, withdrawals, and swaps separated so that reserve changes are not mistaken for fresh buying.

Fee income also belongs to liquidity providers rather than all $XRP holders. XRPL's documentation describes relative-price and arbitrage risks, and concentrated liquidity adds range management: Uniswap's explanation shows how a position can become entirely one asset and stop earning fees outside its range. More efficient capital is not automatically more profitable capital.

The tests before a demand claim

AMM V2 remains proposed work. The discussion opened in May, and the Foundation's feasibility page was updated on Nov. 4. Its roadmap lists rebasing and reopening the implementation pull request, followed by review and audit, as the next steps. Activation would require validator approval, and the current specification gives binned pools a separate amendment gate from concentrated liquidity and StableSwap.

Notably, the Foundation's Nov. 4 assessment stated that no issuer, wallet, exchange, or DEX front end had publicly committed to using the pools.

For $XRP holders, persistent inventory tied to additional funded use would strengthen the demand case, but larger pool balances alone could reflect capital moved from elsewhere. Better execution, in short, could arrive well before any additional holding demand is demonstrated.