On June 4, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Russian leader Vladimir Putin appeared together, all smiles, at the ceremonial groundbreaking for Uzbekistan's first cluster of nuclear reactors, to be built by Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom. "I am confident that you have chosen the best option for Uzbekistan out of all those offered," Putin told Mirziyoyev at the time. For Uzbekistan, Central Asia's most populous country with roughly 37 million people, the plant represents an attempt to shore up a power grid strained by rapid population growth and rising demand, while cutting reliance on natural gas-fired generation that otherwise earns export revenue.

Three months later, it is clear that Mirziyoyev is having second thoughts about his selection of Rosatom. On September 2, his presidential press service published a lengthy update on the construction of the integrated nuclear plant. Rosatom was not mentioned once in the announcement.

What the statement did mention was that Mirziyoyev had endorsed the creation of a new consortium to oversee the construction process. "To improve project management, strengthen technical oversight, and conduct independent assessments of technological solutions, it is proposed to establish a joint venture with leading international engineering companies," it emphasized.

The statement did not provide details about the envisioned consortium's composition. The lack of specifics leaves considerable room for speculation about Rosatom's future role in the project. What seems certain is that the Russian entity, long a dominant force in the global nuclear energy market — Rosatom is one of the world's largest exporters of nuclear technology, with reactor projects spanning countries from Bangladesh and India to Egypt and Turkey — no longer enjoys the Uzbek government's trust to get the job done on its own.

Uzbek frustration with Rosatom appears to have been building for some time, at least since the start of 2026. In January, Uzbek authorities postponed the start of nuclear plant construction, which was originally scheduled for March. Then, in August, Mirziyoyev made a surprise announcement that "extensive preparatory work" had been done for the construction of a second nuclear plant. He did not say where and when construction would start, who would build it, or how much it would cost.

Reading between the lines, the September 2 statement supports the notion that there is considerable underlying tension in Uzbek-Russian relations. Putin has perhaps been more overt in signaling displeasure with the recent course of bilateral relations, but Mirziyoyev's omission of Rosatom indicates that discontent runs both ways. The episode also fits a broader pattern in which Central Asian governments have sought to diversify their security and economic partners among Russia, China, the United States, and other powers rather than aligning with a single patron.

In another move sure to vex Putin, Mirziyoyev met on September 3 in Tashkent with retiring US Sen. Steve Daines, just days after the two had met in Bishkek along with Trump administration special envoy Sergio Gor. Details about the second Daines meeting were scant, but two meetings over a four-day span in two different cities suggest serious discussions took place. Over the past year, the Trump administration has expressed interest in developing nuclear energy cooperation with Central Asian states, especially in the development of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs).

The central issue in the Uzbek-Rosatom relationship seems to revolve around money, or more specifically the lack of it. The Uzbek project envisions the construction of two 1-gigawatt VVER-1000 reactors and two smaller 55-megawatt RITM-200N models, along with the necessary infrastructure and housing in the vicinity to accommodate up to 33,000 plant workers and their families. The overall cost is currently estimated at $9.5 billion — a substantial sum for an economy whose annual GDP is roughly $100 billion. Where all the financing will come from remains up in the air. Russia has proposed at least one financing plan that Tashkent apparently found unattractive.

Mirziyoyev's September 2 update indicates that beyond the financing question, Uzbekistan aims to downgrade Rosatom's role in the project, intending to secure a larger share of the work for Uzbek contractors and workers. "According to preliminary estimates, local production accounts for 21 percent of the project, or $1.9 billion. The head of state noted that this figure is insufficient," the statement reads. "The goal is to increase the share of domestic production in the project to at least 30 percent, ensure that 65 percent of construction and installation work is carried out by national enterprises and employ 7,000 local workers and specialists."

To accelerate the localization of construction, Mirziyoyev ordered officials to prepare a plan for establishing a manufacturing complex near the nuclear facility worksite to produce building materials and components for the power plant. How — and whether — Rosatom responds, and which international engineering firms might join the new consortium, are likely to shape the project's next phase.

By Eurasianet