U.S. President Donald Trump recently disclosed details of his conversation with Britain's new prime minister, Andy Burnham, whom he referred to as "the new gentleman." Trump said the two discussed "opening up North Sea oil" — a subject of evident interest to the American leader. The topic carries added significance: U.K. North Sea oil and gas production has been declining for years, and Labour has pledged to end new exploration licenses as part of its clean energy transition. However, few indications have yet emerged regarding how Burnham intends to navigate the so-called "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom.

The challenge is compounded by the past rhetoric directed at Trump by both Burnham and his foreign secretary, Ed Miliband. In 2016, Miliband — now Britain's top diplomat — described the U.S. president as a "racist, misogynistic self-confessed groper." Those remarks, along with Burnham's own prior criticisms of Trump, loom over the new government's efforts to establish a productive working relationship with Washington.

Dealing with Trump will undoubtedly be a foreign policy priority for Burnham. Yet the obstacles facing the special relationship extend well beyond personal chemistry. The persistent political instability that has gripped the U.K. since the 2016 Brexit referendum — which resulted in the country's departure from the European Union — continues to spill over into foreign policy. Frequent leadership turnover is not only hindering domestic reform efforts; it is also undermining the U.K.'s capacity to project a coherent strategy on the global stage.

Unprecedented Leadership Turbulence

The U.K. has experienced a remarkable leadership carousel over the past decade. Burnham is the sixth prime minister since David Cameron resigned in the wake of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. The turnover extends across senior government positions as well: Miliband has become the ninth foreign secretary during that same period.

This level of instability is historically anomalous. Not since the 1820s has the country seen as many different prime ministers within a ten-year span. The past decade also represents a sharp departure from the broader post-World War II era, during which the special relationship helped navigate the reconstruction of Europe, the Cold War, China's rise, and the threat of international terrorism.

Between 1945 and 2016, British prime ministers averaged five years in office. Since 2016, that figure has plummeted to just 24 months.

Each post-2016 prime minister was ultimately brought down for different reasons — including repeated scandals, poor political choices, and lost elections. In every case, however, deep structural forces — particularly the fallout from Brexit — eroded their leadership.

Like his predecessors, Burnham inherits a sluggish economy, partly attributable to the substantial economic costs of leaving the European single market. He also leads an economy more exposed to Trump's challenges against the rules-based trading order, while no longer benefiting from the buffer provided by the EU's large internal market. A comprehensive U.S.–U.K. free trade agreement — long promoted by Brexit advocates as a key economic prize of leaving the EU — has remained out of reach despite intermittent negotiations, leaving Britain without a major bilateral trade arrangement to offset the loss of EU market access.

Domestically, Brexit has deeply polarized the British electorate into new identity camps — Leavers and Remainers — who show weaker loyalty to established political parties. This dynamic has fueled greater electoral volatility and accelerated the fragmentation of British politics. For the first time in a century, there is a strong possibility that the next prime minister will not come from either of the two dominant parties, Labour or the Conservatives.

The shift toward a more multiparty system has intensified competition in local elections, producing more vulnerable parliamentary seats and members of Parliament elected with razor-thin majorities. This trend has coincided with a growing propensity among lawmakers to rebel against their own leadership.

Burnham therefore faces a formidable challenge if he hopes to bring stability to No. 10 Downing Street.

Short-Lived Transatlantic Tandems

The consequences of Britain's leadership carousel extend well beyond domestic politics. Maintaining a consistent and coherent foreign policy is inherently difficult when the decision-makers change so frequently. This is especially significant for the special relationship, as Brexit has made the U.K. more dependent on the U.S.

While much current attention focuses on how Burnham manages his relationship with Trump, leadership instability presents broader structural challenges for the U.K.–U.S. partnership.

The United States is also experiencing heightened political turnover. Public trust in the U.S. government fell to 17% in 2025, with voters growing increasingly restless. At least one chamber of Congress has changed hands in every election cycle since 2018, a streak likely to continue in the November midterms. The succession of three one-term presidents has not occurred in over a century.

As a result, leadership ties between Washington and London have struggled to gain traction. Over the past decade, the average U.S.–U.K. leadership tandem has lasted barely more than a year. At best, Burnham and Trump could overlap for a little over two years — much of which would include the latter's lame-duck period.

An Unclear Post-Brexit Strategy

U.S. statesman Dean Acheson's famous 1962 remark that "Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role" remains resonant. Exiting the EU posed a fundamental challenge for the U.K. and its global positioning. Brexit eroded Britain's capacity to serve as a bridge between America and Europe.

Burnham has inherited no clear roadmap for a post-Brexit Britain. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that deeply divided societies are less equipped to sustain long-term strategic frameworks. Successive post-2016 leaders failed to articulate a coherent post-Brexit doctrine, instead relying on an ad hoc balancing act among an Atlantic-oriented path, deeper cooperation with European partners, and strategic autonomy. This uncertainty is especially problematic at a time when the U.K., like many of its European neighbors, is confronting the central dilemma of how to defend Europe without the U.S. Trump has consistently pressed NATO allies to raise defense spending toward the 2% of GDP benchmark, adding fiscal pressure to an already demanding strategic recalibration.

Strong Headwinds

If Burnham wishes to preserve and strengthen the special relationship, he will need sustained time in office to counter powerful headwinds.

Historically, the U.S.–U.K. partnership has weathered difficult periods and politically mismatched leaders. Burnham is regarded as positioned to the left of his predecessor, Keir Starmer, within the center-left Labour Party — placing him considerable distance from Trump's brand of conservatism. Yet Tony Blair and George W. Bush overcame divergent political ideologies a generation ago to forge a notably close alliance.

However, the special relationship of that era was underpinned by deeper institutional ties — cultural, diplomatic, military, and intelligence-based. The 2021 AUKUS security pact, under which the U.S. and U.K. agreed to share nuclear-powered submarine technology with Australia, represents one of the most significant recent concrete initiatives anchoring that institutional partnership. Yet those broader bonds have been somewhat blunted by Trump's highly personalized approach to diplomacy. His mistrust of the federal bureaucracy has limited Britain's ability to leverage its deep-rooted connections within the American foreign policy establishment.

Furthermore, Trump's profound unpopularity in the U.K. is affecting perceptions of the alliance itself. Just 13% of Britons held a favorable opinion of Trump, compared to 83% with an unfavorable view. Increasingly, the British public views the U.S. as a necessary partner rather than an ally bound by shared values. This disaffection is reciprocal: American approval of Britain has dropped by 15% over the past five years. A segment of the MAGA base also perceives the U.K. as a nation in decline.

Burnham has thus inherited an immense task, both domestically and internationally. He must confront the same Brexit-related challenges that toppled his predecessors while simultaneously crafting a more coherent post-Brexit vision for the country. Progress on both fronts would go a long way toward restoring stability to the special relationship.

Garret Martin, Hurst Senior Professorial Lecturer and Co-Director of the Transatlantic Policy Center at American University School of International Service. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.