NewsCryptoTHORChain Rejects Bitget's Request to Block Exploit Addresses as Star Xu Questions Decentralization Claim

THORChain Rejects Bitget's Request to Block Exploit Addresses as Star Xu Questions Decentralization Claim

Author: Crypto Adventure·

Key Takeaways

  • •THORChain rejected Bitget CEO Gracy Chen's request to block addresses tied to the September 24 exploit, describing itself as decentralized and permissionless like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB Chain.
  • •Bitget raised its exploit loss estimate to approximately $387.5 million from an initial $351.6 million after additional Zcash and TRON transactions were classified.
  • •OKX CEO Star Xu argued THORChain's validator-controlled TSS vaults make it an intermediary, citing its response to its May exploit, which took the network offline for roughly five weeks before a June 22 restart.
  • •THORChain's emergency documentation confirms network-wide and chain-specific halt powers but describes no protocol-level mechanism for selectively blacklisting a single external wallet.
  • •Bitget said some stolen assets have been frozen through cooperation with exchanges and security firms, and its recovery program offers a 5% bounty for actions that directly result in frozen or recovered funds.
THORChain Rejects Bitget's Request to Block Exploit Addresses as Star Xu Questions Decentralization Claim

THORChain has rejected calls to block addresses tied to Bitget's September 24 exploit, defending its permissionless architecture as criticism mounts over whether the cross-chain protocol's validator-controlled vaults make it comparable to base-layer networks such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. The dispute has become a public test of how permissionless infrastructure handles identified stolen funds, and of whether decentralization claims hold up against a protocol's own documented emergency controls.

The exchange has also raised its loss estimate. Bitget has confirmed in an official statement that approximately $387.5 million was transferred to attacker-controlled addresses during the wallet breach, up from an initial estimate of $351.6 million after additional Zcash and TRON transactions were classified.

Bitget CEO Gracy Chen publicly asked THORChain to refuse service to the identified addresses, writing in a post on X that “decentralization is a design principle, not a shield for facilitating known stolen funds.”

THORChain pushed back in its own X post, describing itself as “decentralized and permissionless like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB Chain” and asking what responsibility those networks should bear when known stolen funds pass through them.

Star Xu Challenges THORChain's Bitcoin Comparison

OKX founder and CEO Star Xu disputed the comparison in a post on X, focusing on THORChain's Threshold Signature Scheme and validator-controlled vault architecture.

Xu argued that the protocol's selected validator set collectively controls the assets held inside its TSS vaults and can move them once the required signing threshold is reached. He described THORChain as an intermediary standing between users and the native chains, adding: “Distributing an intermediary does not eliminate the intermediary.”

In a second response, Xu pointed to THORChain's own intervention during its May vault exploit, arguing that its demonstrated ability to stop network activity separates it from Bitcoin's base-layer architecture.

THORChain's incident report confirms that automatic solvency controls first halted signing and trading across several chains after approximately $10.7 million was drained. Node operators then stacked manual pauses and cast Mimir governance votes, bringing trading, signing, chain observation and churning to a full controlled halt within roughly two hours.

The protocol's Q2 report records a substantially longer disruption than the 13-hour period cited in Xu's post: THORChain remained offline for roughly five weeks before restarting on June 22 with patched TSS code and the ADR-028 recovery framework.

THORChain Documentation Confirms Broad Halt Powers

THORChain's emergency procedures explicitly describe the make pause function as the “big red button that stops everything.” A node operator can initiate a 720-block network pause, while additional operators can extend it. Nodes can also vote through Mimir to halt signing for individual connected chains.

Those controls establish that THORChain operators can interrupt protocol activity. The published documentation does not, however, describe an equivalent protocol-level mechanism for selectively blacklisting one external wallet while allowing all other swaps to continue. That gap frames the practical impasse at the center of the standoff: Bitget has requested address-level blocking, while the emergency tools on record cover network-wide or chain-specific halts only.

MistTrack, SlowMist's onchain tracking platform, also entered the dispute after tracing Bitget-related funds into THORChain for swaps and cross-chain transfers. It argued that “decentralization should not become a blanket excuse” when publicly flagged stolen funds are involved.

Security researcher Taylor Monahan separately challenged THORChain's non-intervention argument in a post on X, pointing to the network's established ability to pause operations and coordinate protocol changes.

Bitget says some affected assets have already been frozen through cooperation with exchanges, blockchain projects and security firms. Its recovery program now offers a 5% bounty for eligible actions that directly result in stolen assets being frozen or recovered. Whether THORChain maintains its non-intervention stance, and how much of the revised $387.5 million is ultimately recovered, are the immediate markers to watch.