Crypto and Card-Stealing Malware Hit Websites Across 178 Organizations
Key Takeaways
- •An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation service to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, affecting 178 organizations including Ledger, Coinpass, IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers.
- •Researcher Scott Helme's investigation of 1,611 scripts associated with the platform identified 188 infected JavaScript files running in visitors' browsers.
- •The malware could replace legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones during copying, with functionality targeting Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana and several other networks.
- •The code also monitored website forms and payment requests for card numbers, expiration dates and security codes, though it could not read card fields inside payment frames hosted on a different origin.
- •Optimizely fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts, but the number of exposed visitors and the total financial losses remain unknown.

Attackers planted malicious code in website scripts belonging to 178 organizations, including Ledger and Coinpass, exposing visitors to cryptocurrency theft and credit card skimming on November 16, security researchers have found. The episode highlights how a shared technology provider can spread financial risk across otherwise unrelated businesses — a pattern known as a supply-chain compromise, in which a single trusted vendor becomes an entry point for many downstream sites.
The incident centered on Optimizely, a website experimentation platform whose scripts run inside visitors' browsers on client sites. Security researcher Scott Helme's investigation identified 188 infected JavaScript files after examining 1,611 scripts associated with the platform. The affected organizations also included trading firms IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers, alongside companies outside financial services. The organization count does not establish how many visitors encountered the malware or lost money. Because third-party scripts execute alongside a site's own code in the visitor's browser, a breach at the vendor level inherits the trust visitors place in each affected brand.
Trusted Scripts as a Delivery Channel
Optimizely's service helps businesses test website changes through scripts that run in visitors' browsers. According to the company, an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation service to insert malicious JavaScript into customer projects. That allowed trusted website components to load the attackers' theft tools, exposing visitors through familiar business websites rather than requiring them to follow links to fraudulent pages — with little on the page itself to signal that anything had changed.
The malware could replace legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, including when visitors copied payment details. Someone copying a deposit address, for example, could unknowingly paste a different destination into a wallet application, a technique commonly known as clipboard hijacking — one reason verifying a pasted address before confirming a transfer is a standard precaution. Researchers also found functionality targeting Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana and several other cryptocurrency networks.
Payment Card Data Also Targeted
Separately, technical analysis found that the malware monitored website forms and payment requests for card numbers, expiration dates and security codes, and could transmit captured details to the attacker's server. However, the analyzed code could not read card fields inside payment frames hosted on a different origin, limiting that collection method. That limit reflects browser rules designed to isolate content hosted on a different origin from the surrounding page — a boundary the analyzed code could not cross.
Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and secured the affected accounts. Helme's monitoring found only one previously infected script still carrying malware at 9:52 p.m. UTC on November 16.
The cleanup reduced immediate exposure, but the financial impact remains uncertain. Researchers identified cryptocurrency transfers involving attacker wallets, although available blockchain activity does not establish a complete victim-loss figure. How many visitors were actually exposed, and how much money ultimately reached attacker wallets, remain the open questions that further monitoring and blockchain analysis could clarify. For website operators, the case also illustrates the stakes of knowing exactly which third-party scripts run on customer-facing pages, since any of them executes with the same visitor-facing trust as the site itself. The incident underscores how compromised browser scripts can threaten both digital-asset transfers and conventional online payments through a single attack.
Source: CryptoMeter io