Commercial shipping risk in the Strait of Hormuz remains elevated compared with the brief recovery that followed the mid-June de-escalation, according to an assessment cited by Hellenic Shipping News and attributed to Dryad Global.

Visible AIS traffic remains far below normal levels, war-risk premiums are still high, and many operators are delaying voyages, limiting exposure or moving through the area with AIS switched off. Large energy carriers, especially crude tankers and LNG vessels, remain the most exposed vessel category because of their strategic value, limited manoeuvrability and importance to global energy markets.

Why the Strait of Hormuz remains critical

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most strategically important maritime chokepoints. At its narrowest, the strait is roughly 21 nautical miles wide, with inbound and outbound shipping lanes each approximately two miles wide, leaving little room for deviation. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the strait carried approximately 20 to 21 million barrels per day of crude oil, condensate and refined products at recent levels, equivalent to roughly a fifth of global oil consumption. Qatar, one of the world's largest LNG exporters, relies almost entirely on the strait for its seaborne gas shipments.

Any sustained disruption to commercial shipping through the strait carries immediate implications for energy security, freight markets, insurance pricing and regional stability.

For shipowners, operators, charterers, insurers and governments, the central question is no longer simply whether the Strait of Hormuz is open or closed. The more important issue is whether conditions provide enough confidence, predictability and legal certainty for commercial shipping to resume normal operating patterns.

Dryad Global's current assessment is that they do not.

Current risk to commercial shipping

Commercial shipping risk in the Strait of Hormuz remains elevated compared with the short late-June recovery period. Although some transits continue, the operating environment remains fragile, contested and highly sensitive to any further escalation.

In early June, before the mid-June US-Iran memorandum of understanding, the strait was severely disrupted by the wider regional conflict. Commercial traffic was low, confidence was weak, and many operators were unwilling to send vessels into the area unless passage was commercially unavoidable.

The mid-June agreement produced a short-lived improvement. Daily transits rose from extremely low levels, although they remained well below the pre-war norm of approximately 120 to 140 vessels per day. Risk assessments briefly eased, with some operators viewing the area as a cautious but potentially manageable operating environment.

That recovery window has since narrowed. Since early July, renewed kinetic incidents, US retaliatory actions and the reinstatement of measures affecting Iranian-related shipping have undermined confidence. As of mid-to-late July, visible AIS traffic through the strait remains significantly reduced. Maritime intelligence nevertheless indicates that regular transits are continuing, often with AIS switched off, at an estimated rate of around 30 to 40 vessels per day.

This does not represent a return to normal trade. It reflects constrained, selective and risk-managed movement.

War-risk premiums remain high, confidence has been eroded, and operators continue to treat the strait as a high-risk environment. The presence of naval forces and the possibility of further escalation mean most commercial operators are not returning to standard transit patterns.

How shipping operators are responding

Operators are responding mainly through caution, delay and risk mitigation rather than through any uniform industry-wide approach.

Many planned transits are being paused, postponed or reviewed. Some vessels are holding position outside the highest-risk areas while owners, charterers, insurers and flag states assess whether a passage remains commercially and operationally viable.

Where vessels continue to transit, some are doing so with AIS switched off to reduce visibility. This dark sailing behaviour reflects the level of concern in the market, but it also introduces additional safety and compliance risks, particularly in congested or contested waters.

Route choices are also being reassessed. Some traffic has shifted toward northern lanes following incidents affecting southern and Omani corridors, although routing decisions remain highly dependent on vessel type, cargo, ownership profile, insurance conditions and the latest threat reporting.

Formal convoying remains limited. Although naval presence is significant, there is no single predictable convoy model that has restored confidence across the market. Earlier coordinated evacuation and assistance efforts have also been scaled back or paused at times as the operational picture has changed.

Long-term rerouting remains difficult for Gulf-origin cargoes. The Saudi East-West pipeline and the UAE's Habshan–Fujairah line can divert some crude around the strait, but their combined capacity covers only a fraction of total Gulf export volumes. LNG is particularly difficult to reroute at scale because of infrastructure constraints and the geography of Gulf export terminals, with Qatari terminals especially dependent on passage through the strait.

The result is a market operating below normal throughput, with decisions being made case by case rather than through a broad return to routine passage.

Iran's proposed transit fees

Dryad Global assesses that operators are not primarily responding to Iran's contested transit-fee demands as an administrative or commercial issue. Instead, they are responding to the security environment.

In practical terms, the dominant industry response is not payment, negotiation or procedural compliance. It is avoidance where possible, delay where necessary and risk-managed transit where commercially unavoidable.

The uncertainty surrounding any unilateral fee demand adds another layer of legal and commercial complexity, but it is not the main driver of operator behaviour. The decisive factors remain physical threat, insurance cost, charterparty exposure, crew safety, flag-state advice, naval posture and the risk of becoming a target in a wider geopolitical confrontation.

For most commercial decision-makers, the issue is not whether a transit fee can be absorbed into voyage economics. It is whether the voyage can be conducted safely, lawfully and insurably.

Vessels most exposed in the Strait of Hormuz

Large energy carriers remain the most exposed vessel category at present. This includes crude tankers, particularly VLCCs and ULCCs, as well as LNG carriers.

There are four main reasons for this exposure.

First, these vessels carry strategically significant cargo. Crude oil and LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz are directly linked to global energy security, making energy carriers particularly attractive as tools of pressure or signalling.

Second, these vessels have high commercial and symbolic value. A disruption involving a large tanker or LNG carrier has immediate consequences for markets, insurers and governments, even if the incident does not result in a full closure of the strait.

Third, large energy carriers have limited manoeuvrability. Their size, draft and operating profile make them more constrained in narrow, congested or militarised waters.

Fourth, recent incident patterns have repeatedly involved energy-linked tonnage, including tankers associated with crude and LNG movements. Container ships and other commercial vessels are also exposed, but the current pattern of threat activity continues to place energy carriers at the centre of the risk picture.

Implications for maritime risk planning

The Strait of Hormuz is not currently functioning as a normal commercial transit environment. The fact that vessels continue to move through the area should not be mistaken for restored confidence.

The more accurate picture is one of constrained passage under persistent threat. Operators are balancing commercial necessity against elevated war-risk premiums, uncertain legal conditions, heightened naval activity and the risk of sudden escalation.

For maritime organisations, this reinforces the need for live intelligence, vessel-specific risk assessment and clear decision-making protocols. Generic regional risk ratings are no longer sufficient. Operators need to understand how risk changes according to vessel type, cargo, ownership, routing, AIS posture, insurance status and the latest threat intelligence.

Dryad Global assessment

Dryad Global assesses the Strait of Hormuz as a high-risk operating environment for commercial shipping as of late July. The risk is materially higher than during the brief late-June recovery period, although the strait is not fully closed.

Commercial traffic continues, but at reduced and irregular levels. Some transits are taking place with AIS switched off, and operator confidence remains weak. Large energy carriers, especially crude tankers and LNG vessels, remain the most exposed because of their strategic importance, high cargo value and centrality to global energy markets.

The situation remains dynamic. Further kinetic incidents, changes in US or Iranian posture, insurance market shifts or diplomatic developments could rapidly alter the operating picture.

For shipowners, charterers, insurers and security teams, the priority is not simply to monitor whether the Strait of Hormuz remains open. It is to assess whether the risk picture has changed enough to justify movement, delay or rerouting.

Source: Dryad Global