NewsCryptoResearchers Release 131-Page Security Analysis of Bitcoin's Post-Quantum SHRINCS Proposal

Researchers Release 131-Page Security Analysis of Bitcoin's Post-Quantum SHRINCS Proposal

Author: Bitcoin Magazine·

Key Takeaways

  • •The 131-page analysis estimates SHRINCS' classical security at 121.4 to 122.7 bits, compared with roughly 128 bits for Bitcoin's current elliptic curve signatures, and relies in part on three unproven conjectures.
  • •SHRINCS combines two hash-based designs under one key: a stateful construction built on FXMSS with WOTS+C and a stateless fallback based on SLH-DSA, which NIST standardized as FIPS 205 in 2024.
  • •Proposed SHRINCS signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes in the stateful path and 5,777 bytes in the stateless fallback, far larger than Bitcoin's current 64-byte Schnorr or roughly 71-byte ECDSA signatures, raising block-space concerns.
  • •The stateful path relies on one-time keys, so accidental key reuse could allow attackers to forge signatures and steal funds, prompting Blockstream's Jonas Nick to call for wallets to fall back automatically to the stateless path.
  • •The authors say the work is incomplete and insufficiently peer reviewed, and they are seeking feedback from engineers, cryptographers, and protocol developers through the public GitHub repository and draft BIP.
Researchers Release 131-Page Security Analysis of Bitcoin's Post-Quantum SHRINCS Proposal

Several researchers have published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin, and are asking the wider community to look for flaws in it.

Researcher Mikhail Kudinov announced the first version on Thursday in a thread on X, saying the paper reduces SHRINCS' security to the properties of its underlying hash function. The analysis, published on GitHub and dated Nov. 18, estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though the figures rest on assumptions that include three unproven conjectures. For comparison, Bitcoin's current elliptic curve signatures are generally estimated to offer around 128 bits of security.

Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still working on a new analysis of a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has so far been conjectured, as well as on tightening a reprogramming step and improving a bound against quantum attackers. Those open items, together with peer review and the feedback the draft proposal draws, are what to watch as SHRINCS moves through public scrutiny.

How SHRINCS works

SHRINCS is a hash-based scheme, meaning its security rests on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve mathematics behind Bitcoin's current signatures. That distinction is central to its post-quantum purpose: sufficiently powerful quantum computers running Shor's algorithm could break the elliptic curve signatures Bitcoin uses today, whereas hash-based constructions are widely regarded as among the most conservative post-quantum options. It places two designs under one key: a stateful part built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA, the stateless hash-based scheme the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology standardized as FIPS 205 in 2024. Because both use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the proof has to cover both.

Signature size is the main cost. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures typically come in around 71 bytes. Signatures take up scarce block space, so larger ones mean fewer transactions per block.

The risk of a stateful signature

The compact stateful path carries a danger. It relies on one-time keys, and if a wallet accidentally reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal the funds. Wallet software therefore has to track the state of every key. The stateless path avoids the problem, but at a much larger size.

Jonas Nick, Blockstream's director of research, told Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation, on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically fall back to the stateless path whenever a state counter could be compromised. "It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens," he said. "Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly."

Nick also warned that heavy use of the larger signatures would weigh on the network. "We don't know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures," he said. "And it's not just the fee market, it's also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin."

Researchers ask for review

The authors are clear that the analysis needs scrutiny. Kudinov said it has not been sufficiently peer reviewed, and the project's GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. "We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes," he wrote, asking readers to open an issue if they find one.

The team also produced two results that are not specific to SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov said the findings also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the hash-based schemes SHRINCS borrows from, and that they were published as separate papers.

The SHRINCS work lands as quantum risk climbs the agenda. A global securities regulators' group warned this week that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially hard, and researchers recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network after Bitcoin's first quantum-safe transaction was demonstrated without a fork.

The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS is also open for comment. "We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," said Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream. "There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise."