Divorce Cannot Be Allowed to Creep Into the Philippines, UA&P Law Dean Argues
Key Takeaways
- •Gatdula says the Philippines should not adopt divorce merely because it exists in other countries, arguing that the country may have made the right policy choice already.
- •He cites studies he says show children of divorced parents tend to perform worse across academic, behavioral, psychological, and social measures.
- •He argues that expanding the Supreme Court’s Republic v. Manalo ruling to cover divorces between Filipino spouses would create a wealth-based two-tier system.
- •He says Congress, not the Supreme Court, has the authority to establish a general divorce regime, and no divorce bill has yet become law in the Philippines.
- •He points to constitutional and international jurisprudence he says protects marriage but does not recognize a right to divorce.

In an opinion column for BusinessWorld, Jemy Gatdula, dean of the University of Asia and the Pacific (UA&P) Law School, argues against introducing divorce in the Philippines, contending that the main argument for recognizing it "proceeds from a banal fallacy: that because all other countries do it, then therefore the Philippines should do the same." He adds that the reasoning is "a bit racist as well," because it removes from all consideration the possibility that "perhaps — just perhaps — the Philippines got it right."
The column enters one of the country's longest-running social-policy debates. The Philippines is one of only two states in the world — the other being Vatican City — that do not provide for divorce, and in this predominantly Catholic country, where the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines has consistently opposed divorce legislation, spouses seeking to exit marriages rely on remedies under the Family Code such as annulment, declaration of nullity, and legal separation.
Gatdula cites decades of research on the effects of divorce on children. In their 1991 meta-analysis of 92 studies published in Psychological Bulletin, Paul Amato and Bruce Keith found that "children of divorce scored lower than children in intact families across a variety of outcomes," with the median difference being 0.14 of a standard deviation. Amato's 2001 update, examining another 67 studies in the Journal of Family Psychology, found that children of divorced parents "continued to score significantly lower" in academic achievement, conduct, psychological adjustment, self-concept, and social relations.
Turning to contemporary headlines about school shootings, the columnist writes that what mainstream media — "mostly liberal," in his words — refuse to report is that most, if not all, of the shooters, at least in the United States, were bereft of fathers, "whether due to divorce, death, or imprisonment," as Susan Goldberg points out ("When Will We Have the Guts to Link Fatherlessness to School Shootings?", February 2018).
He further quotes Terry Brennan, co-founder of Leading Women for Shared Parenting: "72% of adolescent murderers grew up without fathers; the same for 60% of all rapists. Seventy-percent of juveniles in state institutions grew up in single- or no-parent situations. The number of single-parent households is a good predictor of violent crime in a community, while poverty rate is not."
Another myth he takes issue with is "that if the parents are happier the children will be happier, too." Not so, he writes, citing Brent Barlow of Brigham Young University ("Marriage Crossroads: Why Divorce Is Often Not The Best Option," 2003): "Indeed, many adults who are trapped in very unhappy marriages would be surprised to learn that their children are relatively content. They don't care if mom and dad sleep in different beds as long as the family is together."
These, he notes, are just the studies on the effects of divorce on children. In his view, the damaging effects of divorce on adults, the US economy, productivity, national security, and society at large are "all also devastating."
On the legal front, Gatdula criticizes Republic v. Manalo, the Supreme Court's 2018 ruling expanding the scope of the Family Code's Article 26, effectively allowing divorce for Filipinos married to a foreigner. Regardless of one's view of the decision — which he regards as "an open demonstration of judicial legislation" — he argues it should not be taken as license for the Supreme Court, "with all due respect," to double down. Expanding Manalo to allow a divorce obtained abroad between married Filipinos, he writes, would be "clearly anathema" to the national interests, to the people directly involved, and to the Constitution itself.
Such an expansion would also create what he calls an inequality problem: assuming divorce is a beneficial right, why should it be available only to those who can afford to travel abroad, while those without sufficient resources remain subject to present Philippine law? The result would effectively be "a two-tier system, in which access to a supposed right depends upon wealth."
Ultimately, Gatdula argues, the judiciary does not have the authority to transform an existing statutory exception into a general divorce regime for Filipinos. If state policy allows Filipino couples to divorce, then Congress — not the Supreme Court — is the mandated government authority to make that call, and Congress, "rightfully," has not done so. Divorce bills have indeed been filed in successive Congresses for more than two decades without becoming law; the closest any came to enactment was the House of Representatives' May 2024 approval on third and final reading of a bill instituting absolute divorce, which did not pass the Senate before the 19th Congress ended in June 2025.
He reminds readers that the Supreme Court itself has a long record of upholding marriage. In Tilar v. Republic, it stated that marriage is "an institution the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested," for which the State is mandated to maintain its "purity, continuity and permanence" because "the security and stability of the State are largely dependent upon it." In Paras v. Paras, the Court likewise emphasized Article XV.2, declaring marriage an "inviolable social institution," such that doubts are to be resolved in favor of its validity. That provision — Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — reads: "Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."
International jurisprudence, he adds emphatically, does not recognize divorce as a human right. In Babiarz v. Poland, a 2017 decision, the European Court of Human Rights expressly observed that "European law did not recognize the right to divorce" and rejected the claim that the Convention required a State to grant a divorce against the wishes of the other spouse. The Court also warned against a "purely individualistic concept of liberty" understood as freedom from societal and family obligations.
Finally, Gatdula takes issue with the framing of divorce as a mere exercise of the "right to choose whom one loves." Distinctions must be made, he writes: the capacity to love is not itself a constitutional right, nor does the Constitution contain a specific right to choose the object of one's affection. Liberty protects thought and belief, but conduct may be regulated when legitimate public interests are involved. Marriage falls squarely within this latter category, he argues, because it creates legal responsibilities concerning spouses, children, property, family, and ultimately societal life.
Jemy Gatdula is the dean of the UA&P Law School and a Philippine Judicial Academy lecturer for constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence. The views expressed in the column are his own and not necessarily those of the institutions to which he belongs. He can be found on Facebook and on Twitter @jemygatdula.