It should be uncontroversial to acknowledge that Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. has restored strategic coherence to Philippine national security policy. Under his leadership, the DND has accelerated military modernization, reoriented the Armed Forces toward external defense, strengthened alliances with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other partners, and adopted a disciplined, institution-centered approach to governance. This reorientation comes at a critical juncture, as China continues to press expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, constructing militarized artificial islands and routinely confronting Philippine vessels lawfully operating within the country's exclusive economic zone.

Secretary Teodoro has also advanced a proposition long absent from Philippine policymaking: a substantial increase in defense spending, which he argues should reach 4% of GDP. This reflects strategic common sense. The Philippines cannot defend its maritime domain, modernize its armed forces, and sustain credible deterrence while remaining among the region's lowest defense spenders.

The proposal is also economically sound. As Rocio Gatdula argues in her book National Security and the Philippine Defense Economy, sustained defense investment contributes to economic growth by expanding advanced manufacturing, logistics, research and development, infrastructure, and skilled employment. The experience of the United States, Israel, South Korea, and Japan demonstrates that defense capability and economic development are frequently complementary rather than competing objectives. Security is itself productive capital.

The Philippines presently spends only about 1.3% to 1.5% of GDP on defense. NATO treats 2% as the minimum benchmark. South Korea spends roughly 2.8%, while Poland now exceeds 4% in response to a deteriorating security environment. An archipelagic state confronting sustained coercion in the West Philippine Sea—where Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels have employed water cannons, blockading maneuvers, and aggressive shadowing against Philippine resupply and patrol missions—has no strategic justification for prolonged underinvestment.

The constitutionality of increased defense spending is also well-grounded. In Guingona vs. Carague (1991), the Supreme Court stated: "While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to 'assign the highest budgetary priority to education' in order to 'insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives."

The question now is whether this strategic direction survives beyond 2028, when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s single six-year term ends and a new administration assumes office.

Military modernization and security alliances unfold over decades, and national security cannot depend upon the caprices of whatever succeeding administration takes office. The Revised AFP Modernization Act (Republic Act 10349), which extended the original 1995 modernization program, is itself set to expire in 2028, lending additional urgency to institutionalizing defense priorities before that deadline. Fortunately, the Constitution provides mechanisms to make continuity possible.

While Article VII.17 vests executive power in the President, it does not make him the sole architect of national security policy. The Constitution requires the Senate to concur on treaty alliances and assigns to Congress control of public expenditures. To achieve the necessary increase in defense spending, Congress can institutionalize it through authorizations for multi-year contracts, automatic appropriation laws, or earmarking of revenues.

Congress should also utilize its appointment confirmation powers to ensure that Cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, senior military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other such officials are committed to continuity within the permanent national security establishment.

Furthermore, Congress should enact a National Security Strategy Act establishing continuing prioritization of external defense, maritime security, alliance management, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure protection, and defense modernization.

The National Security Council, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the DND and Armed Forces of the Philippines should likewise continue strengthening professionalism within their ranks, ensuring that expertise survives electoral transitions. There is also a need for the private academe to continue research and preserve historical memory to ensure policy stability.

The Third Republic maintained substantial strategic coherence under Presidents Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos P. Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal. Economic policies may have differed, but security policy remained broadly consistent. Each administration recognized the necessity of maintaining capable armed forces, resisting communist insurgency, and preserving the country's alliance with the United States. President Garcia's Filipino First policy pursued greater economic autonomy without abandoning the Republic's strategic orientation. President Fidel V. Ramos applied the same institutional logic following China's occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995. His administration accelerated military modernization—anchored in the original AFP Modernization Act, Republic Act 7898, enacted that same year—strengthened regional security cooperation, and initiated reforms that remain visible today.

Comparable constitutional democracies preserve similar continuity. American administrations change, but Congress shapes defense policy through appropriations, treaty participation, and confirmation of senior officials. Britain's permanent civil service and professional military similarly preserve long-term strategic direction despite changes in government.

It can be done.

Teodoro's most enduring contribution as defense secretary will therefore be measured not by the number of tanks or ships acquired or military exercises undertaken during his watch, but by whether he succeeds in embedding his defense policy within a long-term strategic framework extending beyond 2028, rather than leaving it as an isolated presidential initiative.

The Constitution demands that national interests prevail over petty political interests. And there is a great deal that can be done to ensure that, rather than helplessly waiting for election results.

Jemy Gatdula is the dean of the UA&P Law School and a Philippine Judicial Academy lecturer for constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence. The views expressed here are his own and not necessarily those of the institutions to which he belongs.

Twitter @jemygatdula