NewsCryptoCompromised Optimizely Script Exposed Visitors of 178 Companies to Crypto-Stealing Malware

Compromised Optimizely Script Exposed Visitors of 178 Companies to Crypto-Stealing Malware

Author: Cryptopolitan·

Key Takeaways

  • •Malicious JavaScript distributed via Optimizely's content delivery network reached visitors of 178 companies, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, and Ledger, without attackers needing to breach any of those firms individually.
  • •Report URI's analysis of 1,611 Optimizely scripts identified 188 containing malicious code, in a campaign named OPTIMJACK by researcher Amirul Cyber.
  • •The injected script swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones across Bitcoin, Ether, TRON, Solana, and other chains, and also captured payment-card details, readable cookies, and page screenshots.
  • •Report URI traced approximately $7,040 in receipts to wallets linked to the malicious scripts, while StepSecurity estimated a lower total of about $6,600 across the same wallets.
  • •Similar compromises of third-party scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media occurred between November 13 and 16 using shared infrastructure, suggesting a possible connection that researchers have not yet confirmed.
Compromised Optimizely Script Exposed Visitors of 178 Companies to Crypto-Stealing Malware

A single compromised script within Optimizely's web experimentation platform exposed visitors of 178 companies — among them Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, and Ledger — to malicious JavaScript on November 16. The attackers did not need to breach any of the affected companies individually: the infected code was delivered through Optimizely's trusted content delivery network (CDN) and executed directly in visitors' browsers.

Researchers at Report URI analyzed 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found malicious code in 188 of them — just under 12% of those examined. Researcher Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK.

Trusted code that stopped being trustworthy

By exploiting the Project JavaScript field in Optimizely, the attacker was able to run code hosted at 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Once loaded, the script operated with the same rights as the host website itself. That privilege level is what makes third-party tags such as experimentation and analytics scripts attractive targets: browsers treat them as part of the page, and visitors have no way to distinguish compromised code from legitimate site functionality.

According to Optimizely's permissions documentation, only project administrators and owners may alter snippets. How those basic security protections were bypassed remains unclear, and even Optimizely's own marketing and login pages were serving the malicious code.

Scott Helme, researcher at Report URI, warned: "The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy."

One script, four jobs

The malware scanned pages for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaced them with wallets controlled by the attacker. It reportedly focused on Bitcoin, Ether, various other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin. The substitutions could surface in page content, online forms, copy-pasted addresses, and outgoing network requests. The approach is a textbook "crypto clipper" — the label StepSecurity gives the campaign — and it works because wallet addresses are long strings few users verify character by character.

The operation extended beyond crypto theft. According to Report URI, the same script captured payment-card details and transmitted them to /card.php, while readable cookies and page screenshots were sent to /hit.php. On iPhones and iPads, separate .icu domains delivered code tied to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, according to Infostealers.

Roughly $7,040 — and plenty still unknown

By 19:25 UTC on November 16, Report URI had traced approximately $7,040 in receipts to wallets linked to the malicious Optimizely scripts. StepSecurity estimated a lower total of roughly $6,600, with its review finding that four of the eight wallets had received nothing. Some transactions also took place before the November 16 attack.

None of the estimates establish how much was actually stolen during the attack. Researchers are still working to identify who was behind it, and no figures are available yet on how many payment cards, browsers, or iOS devices were affected. By the end of November 16, the majority of the infected Optimizely scripts had been removed.

Earlier infections share the same plumbing

The Optimizely attack was not the only third-party script compromise that week. Hudson Rock traced similar infections between November 13 and 16 involving scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media. Websites including Security Bank and Fox Sports loaded a malicious script from webshell[.]lol/get.js.

The shared infrastructure suggests a connection between the incidents, though researchers have not established how each provider was compromised or who was responsible.

Where browser defenses failed

Not every infected website allowed the malware to operate. Amirul Cyber identified two pages where the Content Security Policy (CSP) blocked the attacker's script. CSP limits which sources a browser can load code from. Optimizely's guidance includes settings such as strict-dynamic and optional unsafe-eval, among others, but these must be configured very carefully.

For online payments, the PCI Security Standards Council mandates that approved scripts be loaded and checked for integrity and tampering, under requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 — the payment-page script controls that became mandatory under PCI DSS 4.0 in March 2025.

A third-party problem bigger than one vendor

Websites routinely load code from outside providers — analytics, marketing, experimentation — and each script inherits the trust of the page that includes it. Supply-chain exposure reaches well beyond a single vendor. The World Economic Forum found that 65% of large companies consider supply-chain vulnerabilities their biggest resilience challenge, up from 54% in 2025. Verizon linked third parties to 48% of breaches. TRM Labs found that infrastructure compromises caused roughly 76% of crypto-hack losses in the first half of 2026 despite representing just 15% of incidents.

OPTIMJACK shows how visitors can face theft even when a website's own servers remain secure. The open questions — attribution, the permission bypass, and whether the week's incidents share a single operator — are the ones to watch as investigations continue.