Monero Proposal Seeks Randomized Delays to Counter Tor and I2P Transaction Tracking
Key Takeaways
- •Pull request 11743, submitted by Monero contributor vtnerd on November 13 as a revised version of a November 8 proposal, is currently under developer review.
- •The patch would permit nodes to accept Tor and I2P transactions only through incoming connections, while transactions arriving over outgoing connections tied to those networks would be disregarded.
- •Transactions accepted through anonymity-network connections would face randomized delays before entering the Dandelion++ relay process, aimed at disrupting timing patterns that could correlate private arrivals with public broadcasts.
- •Nodes would ignore user requests for immediate broadcasting when transactions arrive via Tor or I2P, subjecting all accepted transactions to the randomized delay requirement.
- •The proposal carries a backport label for possible inclusion in an existing release branch, but its implementation remains contingent on developer approval and release scheduling decisions.

A proposed change to Monero's networking code is under review by the project's developers, with the aim of making it harder to trace transactions that enter the cryptocurrency's network via Tor and I2P. Tor and I2P are anonymity networks that route internet traffic through a series of relays to conceal users' underlying network locations. As outlined in Monero's GitHub repository, the proposal would introduce randomized broadcasting delays designed to disrupt timing patterns that could allow observers to connect activity on anonymity networks with transactions surfacing on Monero's public peer-to-peer network.
The changes are detailed in pull request 11743, submitted by Monero contributor vtnerd on November 13 through the project's GitHub repository. Rather than altering Monero's core privacy features, the proposal concentrates on how nodes receive and relay transactions.
Proposal Targets Timing Analysis of Transactions
Under the current process, Monero nodes may receive transactions through Tor or I2P before forwarding them to peers across the wider network. If a transaction appears publicly shortly after arriving through an anonymity network, that timing relationship could give observers clues about its origin.
An observer watching both the anonymity network and Monero's public network could compare when transactions arrive and when they are broadcast. Patterns of this kind could potentially help tie a publicly visible transaction to the network connection through which it first entered. Timing-based tracking of this sort operates on network-level metadata — when and through which connection a transaction appears — rather than on Monero's on-chain cryptography, which is why countermeasures in this area take shape in networking code.
The proposed patch would reshape this process by permitting nodes to accept Tor and I2P transactions only through incoming connections. Transactions arriving through outgoing connections tied to either anonymity network would be disregarded.
Once accepted through those incoming connections, transactions would also face randomized delays before being forwarded through Monero's existing Dandelion++ relay process, a propagation scheme that first passes transactions along a randomized chain of peers before wider distribution in order to obscure which node originally introduced them. By varying broadcast timing, the proposal aims to make it more difficult to correlate arrivals from private networks with subsequent public broadcasts.
Immediate Broadcasting Requests Would Be Ignored
The proposal also covers requests for faster transaction propagation. Monero currently lets users request immediate broadcasting, but under the proposed rules, nodes would disregard such requests when transactions arrive over Tor or I2P connections.
As a result, every accepted transaction received through those connections would be subject to the randomized delay requirement before entering the Dandelion++ relay process, regardless of any user preference for faster propagation.
The change is specifically designed to reduce timing-based tracking risks between anonymity networks and public peers. It does not amount to a modification of Monero's underlying privacy mechanisms.
Revised Pull Request Awaits Developer Review
The November 13 submission is an updated version of a pull request vtnerd first opened on November 8. Feedback from developers prompted revisions before the newer version was submitted for review.
The patch also carries a backport label, meaning inclusion in an existing release branch remains a possibility. The proposal has not, however, been confirmed for deployment, and its eventual implementation depends on developer approval and decisions regarding release scheduling.
If adopted, the changes would add another layer of protection against timing-based transaction correlation involving Tor and I2P. Further reviewer feedback, revisions, or a merge decision recorded on the pull request will indicate how the proposal progresses. For now, the proposal remains under review within the Monero development process.
Writer: Marcus Renfield