Iran’s central bank has loosened enforcement of its currency controls, allowing exporters to use cryptocurrencies for foreign payments, according to a Financial Times report. The shift does not reflect a published law or formal directive. Instead, it marks a change in enforcement practice that has left exporters operating in a tolerated gray zone.

Iranian exporters primarily use USDT, the US dollar-pegged stablecoin issued by Tether. A stablecoin is a token designed to track the value of a reference currency; in USDT’s case, that reference is the dollar. The arrangement gives holders dollar exposure without requiring a dollar bank account. Transactions are commonly conducted through the Tron network, where fees are relatively low.

Iranian exporters are normally required to repatriate foreign earnings through state-monitored channels. Those channels often apply exchange rates below the free-market rate, effectively creating a discount on each shipment. The size of that discount depends on the gap between the official and free-market rates. Exporters that receive USDT can instead sell it through a domestic crypto exchange or swap it on open markets, reducing their dependence on the official rate.

No public document identifies cryptocurrency as an authorized settlement method for exporters. Iran’s central bank also did not respond to a request for comment from the Financial Times. The bank could withdraw its tolerance without issuing a formal measure. The practical status of the payment channel therefore depends on continued enforcement discretion, rather than on a durable legal authorization.

Crypto use in Iran’s foreign trade is not new. Elliptic estimated that Iran accounted for about 4.5% of global Bitcoin mining in 2021. TRM Labs estimated the volume of cryptocurrency attributed to Iran at approximately USD 9.9 billion in 2025, down from USD 11.4 billion a year earlier. Four exchanges later sanctioned by the United States handled 78% of the 2025 figure.

US sanctions target Iran’s largest crypto exchanges

In June 2026, the US Treasury designated four Iranian trading platforms—Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin and Ramzinex. According to the Treasury statement, the action was taken under Executive Orders 13224 and 13902. The Treasury cited terrorism financing and sanctions evasion as the basis for the designations.

The measure blocks assets belonging to the four exchanges that are within US jurisdiction. Based on TRM Labs data, the platforms collectively handled approximately USD 7.7 billion, equivalent to 78% of the crypto volume attributed to Iran in 2025.

Nobitex was the largest of the four. More than 50% of Iranian digital-asset inflows in 2025 passed through the exchange, according to the Treasury. Wallex accounted for 12% and Bitpin for 10%. Ramzinex handled transactions worth USD 2.45 billion.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control also blocked several Iranian nationals, including Nobitex chairman and co-founder Amir Hossein Rad and chief executive officer Seyed Ali Khoee.

The designations did not eliminate the underlying payment activity. Three months later, the Financial Times described cryptocurrency use in Iran’s export business as normal practice. Sanctions against exchanges initially affect the infrastructure used for trading rather than the demand for cross-border payments. Where trading partners continue to accept USDT, transaction volume can move to other addresses and intermediaries.

Tether freeze highlights limits of sanctions evasion

At the end of April 2026, Tether froze approximately USD 344 million in USDT held at two Tron addresses. According to OFAC, Iran’s central bank controlled the addresses, which formed part of a network that moved proceeds from illegal oil sales. Investigators also linked the network to structures associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The Revolutionary Guard is a separate armed force and is also subject to US sanctions.

The transactions on Tron remained valid after the intervention, but the balances could no longer be transferred. The action took place at the stablecoin issuer level rather than at the blockchain level.

That distinction illustrates the trade-off involved in using a stablecoin. USDT on Tron can provide relatively inexpensive and fast transfers, as well as dollar exposure without access to the US banking system. At the same time, Tether can freeze individual addresses, a measure that is technically unavailable to the issuer of Bitcoin. Parties seeking to evade sanctions through USDT therefore exchange bank-related exposure for issuer-related exposure.

The risk also extends to financial institutions outside the United States. Under US sanctions rules, designated Iranian exchanges are treated as Iranian financial institutions, and US persons generally may not conduct business with them. Non-US institutions can also face exposure if they materially support designated exchanges. The cited actions show that access can be constrained at multiple points—through domestic enforcement, exchange infrastructure, or the stablecoin issuer—even when the underlying blockchain continues to record valid transactions.

Chainalysis reports sanctions-related growth

Chainalysis recorded at least USD 154 billion in inflows to illicit addresses in 2025, a 162% increase from the previous year. Nevertheless, illicit activity represented less than 1% of attributed transaction volume, according to the Crypto Crime Report 2026. Compared with 2024, that share increased only slightly. Unattributed volume is excluded from both sides of the calculation.

Sanctions-related flows accounted for most of the increase. Chainalysis treats payments to addresses associated with sanctioned people, companies and jurisdictions as a separate category, and that category grew the fastest. The value sent to sanctioned addresses increased 694% year over year. The main drivers were Russia, including activity involving the ruble token A7A5, and Iran-related transactions.

As a result, a substantial portion of the increase reflects sanctions breaches rather than fraud or ransomware. The figures are lower-bound estimates because Chainalysis continues to attribute addresses and regularly revises historical values upward. Its estimate for 2024 eventually rose from USD 40.9 billion to USD 57.2 billion.

The Chainalysis and TRM Labs figures are not directly netted against one another and use separate attribution methodologies. TRM’s USD 9.9 billion estimate for Iran is not a subset of Chainalysis’s USD 154 billion figure. It covers incoming and outgoing transactions involving Iranian services and entities, including mostly ordinary trade and savings activity. TRM characterizes the persistent volume as evidence of structural demand rather than speculative trading.