NewsCryptoGlobal Securities Watchdog IOSCO Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Financial Markets and Blockchains

Global Securities Watchdog IOSCO Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Financial Markets and Blockchains

Author: Bitcoin Magazine·

Key Takeaways

  • •IOSCO warned that quantum computing is a significant medium- to long-term cybersecurity challenge for financial markets and urged the sector to begin preparing now, even though no practical quantum computer capable of breaking current cryptography exists yet.
  • •Public blockchains face a harder migration because replacing their embedded cryptography requires hard forks and coordination across thousands of independent validators and node operators, a transition the report said could be slow and fragmented.
  • •Post-quantum signatures under the ML-DSA-44 standard are about 2,420 bytes, roughly 35 to 40 times larger than today's 64-byte signatures, and testing on Solana's quantum-resistant testnet showed throughput falling by about 90%.
  • •Conservative estimates place quantum computers capable of breaking current cryptography in the 2030-2035 window, though some industry participants urged preparing for such machines within five years, and IOSCO flagged 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks as a reason to act today.
  • •An estimated 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of bitcoin's supply, sits in outputs with exposed public keys, while Bitcoin improvement proposals such as BIP 360 and BIP 361 remain drafts with none yet active.
Global Securities Watchdog IOSCO Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Financial Markets and Blockchains

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the global standard-setting body for securities regulators, published a 63-page report on Thursday warning that quantum computing represents a “significant medium to long-term cybersecurity challenge” for financial markets — and that migrating blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may prove especially difficult.

The report states that no practical quantum computer capable of breaking widely used cryptography exists today. Still, the watchdog urged immediate action. “The scale and duration of the transition mean the financial sector should start preparing today,” said Jean-Paul Servais, chair of the IOSCO board, in the release.

The final report drew on a survey of IOSCO members as well as interviews with industry experts and market participants. It found that preparedness across the financial sector remains at an early stage: most firms are still raising awareness, establishing governance frameworks and taking inventory of the cryptography they use, while migration testing and rollout remain limited. Respondents cited reliance on third parties, interoperability, limited expertise and unclear timelines as common obstacles. That early-stage picture is the backdrop to Servais’s warning: for most of the sector, a transition the report describes as large in scale and duration has barely begun.

Why blockchains face a harder quantum migration

IOSCO said the challenge is sharper for public blockchains because cryptography is built into their core design. Replacing it requires hard forks and coordinated action across thousands of independent validators and node operators, and decentralized networks have no mechanism to force a fast upgrade. That could make any migration “slow and fragmented,” the report said.

The report also flagged the cost of the new cryptography. Signatures produced under ML-DSA-44, a post-quantum standard from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, run about 2,420 bytes — roughly 35 to 40 times larger than the 64-byte signatures common today. That overhead could strain throughput, storage and fees. IOSCO cited testing on Solana’s quantum-resistant testnet that showed throughput falling by about 90%.

On exposed coins, the report said a capable attacker could derive private keys from public keys that are already visible on a network, and that uneven migration could leave those assets vulnerable. It singled out dormant or abandoned assets tied to exposed keys, which may be hard to move if their holders cannot be identified or cannot act.

IOSCO did not mention bitcoin by name; the report’s blockchain examples were Ethereum, Solana and Tron.

How soon could the threat arrive?

Timing remains uncertain. IOSCO said conservative estimates put computers capable of breaking today’s cryptography in the 2030–2035 window, but several industry participants argued that firms should prepare for the possibility that such machines emerge within the next five years, potentially accelerated by artificial intelligence. The report also warned of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, in which data collected today is stored until it can be unlocked later — one reason the watchdog frames preparation as a present-day task rather than a distant one.

The report stopped short of setting rules. It urged firms to begin migrating to post-quantum cryptography and to build “crypto-agility” — the ability to swap out cryptography without a major redesign. It also told securities regulators to watch for “quantum washing,” in which companies overstate what their quantum products can do, and said IOSCO will keep quantum computing as a priority in 2027.

Where bitcoin stands

Bitcoin’s exposure to the issue is well documented. Jameson Lopp estimated in May that about 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of the supply, sat in outputs with exposed public keys, including old pay-to-public-key coins from Bitcoin’s early years and addresses that have been reused. In an essay published by Bitcoin Magazine in September, he argued that the debate is about how to minimize property-rights failures, not simply whether to freeze vulnerable coins.

Developers have drafted proposals, but none is active. BIP 360 would add a Taproot-like output type with no exposed public key, and BTQ Technologies has deployed it on a separate test network. Lopp co-authored BIP 361, a draft that would phase out legacy signatures, though he has said the next steps for now do not include it. BIP 360 does not protect coins whose keys are already exposed. For readers tracking the issue, the markers to watch are IOSCO’s continued work on the topic through 2027 and whether any of the drafted Bitcoin proposals move toward activation — in a network where, as the report notes, no mechanism exists to force a fast upgrade.

Lopp made the same point about urgency in that essay: “Waiting until a quantum attacker is visible will leave us with the worst set of possible choices.”

This article first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Micah Zimmerman.