Artificial intelligence-generated photographs discovered in Nigeria's preliminary voter register have raised a question that reaches well beyond the technology that produced them: how did suspicious entries enter a database designed to establish who is eligible to vote? With the 2027 general election approaching, the controversy has placed the Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) verification procedures, access controls, and accountability under scrutiny—not merely its capacity to detect synthetic images.

The preliminary register lists more than 103 million voters, up from approximately 93 million in 2023. While INEC attributes the surge to new registrations, persistent questions over anomalous records have intensified demands for a clearer account of how raw records are checked—and who bears responsibility when systemic irregularities slip through.

Clement Nwankwo, director of the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), challenged the register's credibility in an interview on ARISE News (video), citing alleged AI-generated photographs and unexplained statistical surges in registered voters. His concerns frame a broader institutional test for INEC: removing dubious entries is only a starting point, and the commission must demonstrate that its entire pipeline for collecting, verifying, and auditing electoral data is robust and trustworthy.

Insider access sits at the core of the problem

Responding to the criticism on 30 October, Lawrence Bayode, INEC's director of information and communication technology (ICT), said the commission was working to address the irregularities ahead of releasing the final register on 15 December 2026. His explanation, however, exposed a deeper operational vulnerability: some suspicious entries were inserted directly by registration officers holding authorised access to INEC's core database.

Bayode acknowledged that registration officers across multiple states introduced irregularities into the system, spanning both AI-generated imagery and flawed registration conduct. "They have access to register people," he said, noting that the commission flagged the discrepancies during automated biometric identification system (ABIS) checks.

The admission complicates the narrative that generative technology is the primary culprit behind vulnerabilities in voter lists. Generative AI simplifies the creation of synthetic visuals, but the core issue identified by INEC stems from insider privileges—the individuals authorised to operate registration terminals—and the governance controls surrounding their access.

That breakdown raises critical questions about internal oversight: how are registration officers monitored in real time, what validation rules run before data is committed to the master database, and why were suspicious records not quarantined before reaching the public preliminary register?

The episode also highlights the limits of automated safeguards. Biometric algorithms can detect duplicate fingerprints or abnormal features, yet their effectiveness depends on the integrity of submitted data, sound workflow design, and rigorous follow-up on flagged anomalies.

INEC has yet to specify how many AI-generated photographs or invalid entries were detected, how many officers were implicated, or what disciplinary or legal actions have been initiated. Without these details, the public cannot accurately gauge the scale of the compromise or assess whether existing safeguards are sufficient to restore trust.

A bigger register and a transparency problem

INEC reported registering more than 11 million individuals during its Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) drive for the 2027 polls. Automated biometric checks subsequently purged roughly 1.2 million invalid entries, adding over 9 million voters to the 93 million recorded in 2023. According to Bayode, this automated filtering produced the preliminary total of more than 103 million.

The expansion has nonetheless fuelled public concern, particularly because observers and electors continue to identify glaring errors in the published rolls. The issue extends beyond numerical growth to whether citizens can independently scrutinise data updates and verify INEC's methodologies—matters of acute importance given statutory publishing mandates and the discrepancies already uncovered.

Under Section 19(1) of the Electoral Act, INEC is required to publish and display the preliminary voter register on its website and at every registration ward and local government office at least 90 days before an election. With Presidential and National Assembly elections set for 16 January 2027, the statutory deadline fell on 18 October 2026. Section 20 further obliges the commission to publish the final register at least 30 days before polling, after the claims, objections, and de-duplication process—setting a mid-December 2026 deadline.

INEC missed the 18 October digital publishing deadline, making the preliminary register available online on 26 October—just 81 days before the election. The commission argued that physical displays at ward centres from 9 to 15 October satisfied its obligations, but physical displays alone do not fulfil Section 19(1), which explicitly mandates both physical and online availability. The delay compressed the window for public audit and raised legitimate questions about statutory compliance.

The public review phase has also surfaced further discrepancies. Bayode acknowledged receiving complaints about missing voter records, clerical errors, and address transfers not reflected in the register. While INEC has assured the public that these issues are under review ahead of final publication, resolving individual claims addresses only part of the problem. Voters also require transparency around investigation workflows, verification standards, and audit trails.

The scenario illustrates a fundamental principle of digital election management: external crowdsourcing can surface defects, but it cannot replace institutional internal controls. Nor can public scrutiny restore faith without clear visibility into how errors are rectified and prevented.

INEC's AI ambitions face a governance test

The developments unfold as INEC expands its technological footprint and formulates policies to govern artificial intelligence across its operations. Bayode said the commission currently limits AI deployment to low-risk functions, such as public-query chatbots and logistics planning for election materials, emphasising that these tools do not affect core electoral results.

INEC is also finalising a formal AI governance framework ahead of the 2027 polls to establish operational boundaries for automated tools and ensure human oversight of sensitive decisions. The commission has additionally created a specialised AI division within its ICT department and engaged with regional initiatives focused on the responsible deployment of AI in elections.

These steps indicate awareness of technical risks, but the register controversy shows why governance cannot focus exclusively on software tools. It must also address how human operators interact with systems, how user privileges are audited, and how accountability is enforced when internal controls fail.

Bayode pledged to release the AI policy guidelines publicly. Publishing the rules would enable political parties, civil society organisations, and voters to independently evaluate INEC's operational safeguards.

Trust will depend on what INEC fixes

INEC's commitment to purge synthetic imagery and resolve data discrepancies before 15 December represents a critical test of its operational responsiveness ahead of the 2027 elections. Yet cleansing the register treats only the symptom. To rebuild lasting trust, the commission must disclose how rogue data bypassed system checks, identify the institutional vulnerabilities involved, and detail the technical mechanisms put in place to prevent recurrence.

The dispute reinforces a key reality of digital governance: digitising processes does not by itself guarantee credibility. Technology can streamline administration and flag anomalies, but weak access governance and inadequate oversight risk replicating—and amplifying—the very flaws the digital tools were meant to solve.

For INEC, the imperative ahead of 2027 is not simply deploying sophisticated software but proving that the human and technical systems protecting Nigeria's elections are secure, transparent, and fully accountable. Ultimately, electoral integrity rests not on the number of corrupt entries removed, but on whether citizens can trust the pipeline through which their data is collected, verified, and secured.

This article originally appeared on TechCabal.