NewsMacroHow Much Redistribution Will AI Require?

How Much Redistribution Will AI Require?

Author: Marginal Revolution·

Key Takeaways

  • •Labor income equals GDP multiplied by labor's share, so a smaller share of a much larger economy can still yield equal or greater aggregate labor income.
  • •If AI lifts growth to 10 percent annually, GDP after ten years would be more than twice the no-AI path, allowing labor's share to fall to 28 percent without reducing aggregate labor income.
  • •In the techno-optimist scenario modeled on Amodei, labor's share falls to 22.9 percent, yet the transfer needed to keep labor whole is only 5.3 percent of GDP.
  • •Compensation need not require new taxes equal to the transfer; cutting payroll taxes (about 6 percent of GDP) and replacing them with a broad consumption tax could offset labor.
  • •Even if aggregate labor income is preserved, particular occupations may suffer large losses and painful transitions during the AI shift.
How Much Redistribution Will AI Require?

How much redistribution will AI require? A common scenario holds that AI raises output enormously while labor's share of income collapses: GDP per capita climbs, workers get poorer, and making them whole would demand massive redistribution. In my latest paper, I run the numbers and conclude that this picture is probably incorrect.

The core idea is simple. Labor income equals GDP multiplied by labor's share of GDP—what matters is the product. A smaller share of a much larger economy can still mean more income for labor. If the pie is growing, labor's slice can shrink even as labor income rises.

Suppose that without AI, real GDP per capita grows at 2 percent a year and labor receives 60 percent of GDP—roughly in line with the long-run US labor share. Looking ten years ahead, what is needed to keep labor's income growing at the same rate or better?

If AI lifts growth to 5 percent a year, GDP after ten years will be about 34 percent larger than on the no-AI path. Labor's share could fall from 60 percent to roughly 45 percent, and workers in aggregate would still have exactly as much real income as they would have had without AI.

If AI raises growth to 10 percent a year—the kind of figure Satya Nadella and Dario Amodei talk about—GDP after ten years would be more than twice as large relative to the no-AI path. Labor's share could then fall all the way to 28 percent without reducing aggregate labor income. Twenty-eight percent of an economy that has more than doubled is about the same as sixty percent of the smaller economy.

The paper's figure shows how much redistribution is required after ten years under a variety of scenarios; the white region above the dashed line requires no transfer. Which region are we headed for? Consider three stylized views.

The econ-pessimist, following Acemoglu—whose 2024 analysis projected only modest total factor productivity gains from AI over a decade—holds that AI displaces relatively few tasks because it simply is not productive enough to replace much labor profitably. Growth is only 2.1 percent and labor's share falls to 56.6 percent, although particular industries may still get hammered. The required transfer is 2.7 percent of GDP.

The econ-optimist, in the spirit of Tyler, myself, and Kevin Bryan, argues that automation also creates complementarities and new tasks for humans—the pattern economists have documented in past waves of automation, when new occupations absorbed displaced labor. Growth rises to 4.1 percent, labor's share is 51.4 percent, and both labor and capital gain without any transfer.

The techno-optimist, following Amodei, presents the superficially scariest labor-market scenario: three-quarters of labor income is displaced and labor's share falls to just 22.9 percent. But productivity growth is enormous, producing 10 percent annual growth. The transfer needed to keep labor as a whole on its no-AI path is only 5.3 percent of GDP.

That last calculation is the most surprising. You can have something close to the techno-capitalist dystopia in terms of factor shares—labor receiving less than a quarter of GDP—and still face a manageable redistribution problem, because GDP has become so much larger.

Moreover, a transfer equal to 5 percent of GDP need not mean raising taxes by 5 percent of GDP. Labor is already taxed heavily, so labor could be compensated by shifting from labor taxes to other taxes. Federal payroll taxes alone are about 6 percent of GDP. Cutting payroll taxes and replacing them with a broad consumption tax that also reaches spending from capital income and accumulated wealth would itself be a form of labor compensation, supplemented by transfers to those with no labor income.

Keeping aggregate labor income whole does not mean every worker does well. There could still be enormous churn, big losses in particular occupations, and painful transitions.

Nevertheless, the larger point is that labor's share by itself tells us surprisingly little about the distributional consequences of AI; we also need to know how much the economy grows. If AI produces ordinary growth while dramatically reducing labor's share, redistribution becomes very difficult. But if AI really does produce 5, 10, or 15 percent annual growth, the compensation problem is surprisingly modest even with very large displacement. As I have emphasized elsewhere, we could cut the working week in half under many scenarios, raise hourly wages above the non-AI benchmark, and make both capital and labor better off.

Growth is a good problem to have.

Source: Marginal Revolution.