‘A complete reversal’: China’s auto industry turns the tables on Western carmakers after joining the WTO
Key Takeaways
- •China produced more than 7 million vehicles in the first quarter of 2026, nearly twice the combined EU and U.K. output of 3.7 million and far exceeding the U.S. total of 2.6 million.
- •Joint ventures established since the 1980s, which required Chinese firms to hold at least half of foreign automakers' operations, built local supply chains and deep industrial capabilities that later enabled domestic carmakers like BYD, Chery, and Geely.
- •Electric vehicles allowed Chinese producers to compete on new terms by leveraging the country's existing battery and electronics industries, with government procurement programs, subsidies, and the Made in China 2025 initiative accelerating the sector's growth.
- •China produced 16 million EVs last year, roughly 20% more than domestic demand, pushing exports to double to 2.5 million units as BYD, XPeng, and Xiaomi gained share in Europe and Latin America and BYD outsold Tesla for the first time this year.
- •The U.S. raised tariffs on Chinese EVs to 100% in 2024 citing overcapacity and subsidies, while Volkswagen's deliveries in China fell 36.6% in the second quarter, and Germany's auto industry may need joint ventures with Chinese companies—an arrangement mirroring the one China once used to protect its own manufacturers.

China once feared that European carmakers would overwhelm its domestic auto industry. In the years before China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, a warning circulated throughout the industry: lang lai le—“the wolf is coming.”
The wolf was already partly inside the gates. China had worked with foreign manufacturers, including General Motors and Volkswagen, through joint ventures since the 1980s. But WTO membership required China to abandon 100% tariffs and import quotas that had protected domestic automakers from overseas competition.
A quarter-century later, China has become the world’s dominant carmaker. The country produced more than 7 million vehicles in the first quarter of 2026, according to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. That was nearly twice the combined output of all European Union countries and the U.K., which produced 3.7 million vehicles, and well above the 2.6 million produced in the U.S. The gap underscores how dramatically the industry’s center of gravity has shifted within a single generation.
Electric vehicles helped drive that transformation. The EU and U.S. have imposed tariffs on Chinese-made EVs, citing government support for the industry and the resulting surplus production that has sent low-priced exports into overseas markets. At the same time, weak domestic demand has increased Chinese manufacturers’ reliance on foreign sales.
Germany’s auto industry, facing what has been described as an existential threat, may even require joint ventures with Chinese companies—an arrangement similar to the one China used with Volkswagen decades ago to protect its own automakers.
“There’s been a complete reversal,” Eric Thun, a professor of Chinese business studies at Oxford, told Fortune.
How China built its auto industry
As Beijing and local governments pursued economic growth targets, China expanded its auto industry to the point that it now has the capacity to produce an estimated two-thirds of global car demand.
That outcome was difficult to imagine when Michael Dunne, the former president of General Motors Asia Pacific, first visited China in 1986 as a graduate student studying Mandarin. At the time, he told Fortune, there “was no auto industry” in the modern sense. Two aging models dominated the country’s roads: the boxy Soviet GAZ-24 Volga and the Volkswagen Santana.
That year, Beijing identified auto manufacturing as a pillar of its seventh Five Year Plan. It began inviting foreign automakers to manufacture in China, on the condition that they formed partnerships with Chinese companies that owned at least half of each venture.
By the late 1990s, those joint ventures represented more than 80% of China’s domestic vehicle production, according to a 2000 Congressional Research Service report. The strategy was intended to help China acquire the expertise needed to develop its own carmakers.
That goal was not immediately achieved. Dunne, who spent 36 years in China advising automakers as CEO of Dunne Insights, said the policy helped establish China as a major manufacturing base but did not initially create Chinese companies capable of challenging Volkswagen and General Motors. Those foreign companies continued to lead through innovations in gasoline-powered vehicles.
The joint ventures nevertheless established important industrial capabilities. Thun said China required foreign automakers to source a portion of their components locally. Volkswagen, for example, sent engineers to train Chinese suppliers to meet the company’s manufacturing standards.
“It was through these processes that they really created very deep industrial capabilities,” Thun said.
China’s WTO accession in 2001 also helped create stronger domestic competition. Fengming Lu, an assistant professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University, told Fortune that Beijing relaxed restrictions on new automakers that year. The reasoning was that greater competition would prepare Chinese manufacturers for cheaper imported vehicles.
According to Lu, the policy helped then-battery manufacturer BYD obtain an automaker license in 2003 “because they saw more opportunities in an increasingly competitive but fast-growing auto market.” It also benefited Chery and Geely, which have since become two of China’s largest automotive groups.
After joining the WTO, Beijing further encouraged domestic manufacturers to reduce their dependence on Western technology and said it would provide tax support for research and development.
EVs change the competitive landscape
This institutional support was significant because Chinese automakers remained at a technical disadvantage to European and Japanese manufacturers, which had spent decades refining internal-combustion engines.
Electric vehicles offered China a way to compete on different terms. The country already had substantial battery and electronics industries, giving Chinese companies a foundation for developing EVs.
“It was really the switch to electric vehicles which changed the nature of the game for Chinese producers,” Thun said.
China began supporting EVs in 2009 with a program to deploy electric buses and taxis in cities across the country. Jonas Nahm, a former member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, recalled speaking with Chinese taxi drivers around 2012 who disliked their electric vehicles because limited battery range sometimes forced them to change to gasoline-powered cars during their shifts.
Those early shortcomings nevertheless helped Chinese manufacturers improve, Nahm said. The government’s procurement policies created opportunities for experimentation and forced companies to develop their battery technology.
“These procurement policies essentially forced a lot of learning and gave them sort of space for experimentation, and so over time they just got a lot better at the battery piece, which is so essential for building a competitive car,” Nahm told Fortune.
In 2015, Premier Li Keqiang announced the Made in China 2025 strategic initiative, marking a clear commitment to making China a leader in EVs. Beijing also supported the sector with subsidies and preferential financing, allowing manufacturers to expand rapidly.
That support contributed to excess capacity. China’s prolonged real estate slump further weakened domestic demand, leaving exports to absorb part of the surplus, according to the IMF.
The Tesla effect
Government support alone did not initially persuade Chinese consumers to embrace EVs. Beijing also benefited from the arrival of an American company that helped make electric cars desirable: Tesla.
In 2018, China began removing restrictions on foreign ownership of EV manufacturers. That allowed Tesla to build a factory in Shanghai without a Chinese joint-venture partner. The company broke ground on the facility in 2019 and began delivering locally produced vehicles by the end of that year. The setup broke from the joint-venture model, in place since the 1980s, that had required Chinese companies to own at least half of foreign automakers’ operations in China.
Dunne said Chinese officials viewed Tesla as a “really modern, good-looking electric car that has advanced technology and software.” They believed the company could change negative perceptions of EVs among Chinese consumers.
The strategy appeared to work. Tesla’s Shanghai plant shipped 50,000 cars, and Tesla held 21% of the Chinese EV market during the first half of 2020.
“It was like a miracle happened overnight,” Dunne said. “The Chinese customers just fell in love with Tesla, and then started to change their minds about electrics, and we saw demand for EVs just skyrocket.”
Nahm said allowing Tesla to operate independently also gave Beijing a way to introduce intense outside competition into China’s EV industry. Tesla sourced 95% of its parts locally and raised standards across the sector.
“Tesla was kind of a disruptor in that way,” Nahm said, adding that its arrival “really spurred a lot of investment and technology advances among the domestic auto manufacturers.”
The resulting competition contributed to a price war known as neijuan, or “involution.” Chinese automakers have continued producing vehicles in excess of demand and selling them at a loss in the domestic market. They produced 16 million EVs last year, 20% more than domestic demand, according to the International Energy Agency’s 2026 Global EV Outlook.
Exports became an outlet for the surplus. Chinese EV exports doubled to 2.5 million last year as BYD, XPeng and Xiaomi gained market share in Latin America and Europe. BYD also outsold Tesla for the first time this year.
The export surge prompted accusations of unfair trade practices. In 2024, then-President Joe Biden cited overcapacity and subsidies when his administration raised tariffs on Chinese EVs to 100%, according to a White House fact sheet. The rate matched the 100% tariffs China was required to abandon when it joined the WTO more than two decades earlier.
The reversal is also visible among the European automakers that entered China through joint ventures and are now struggling there. China once accounted for half or more of Volkswagen’s profits, but Volkswagen’s deliveries in China fell 36.6% in the second quarter of this year.
“The global automakers were caught flat-footed thinking they were going to be the darlings of Chinese consumers forever,” Dunne said.
The U.S. and EU tariff regimes, the prospect of joint ventures between German automakers and their Chinese competitors, and Chinese brands’ expanding footholds in Latin America and Europe are the threads to watch as this reversal continues to play out.
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com.