Affected Coldcard seeds require fresh keys

Installing a fixed firmware release leaves every private key derived before the update unchanged. Coldcard's current security guidance directs affected holders to generate a fresh seed and move their funds after verifying the new wallet.

The company documents one exception: seeds created with at least 50 fair, independent and private dice rolls. The final words must have been produced after the rolls, and the sequence must have remained secret. Coldcard also advises passphrase users to migrate as soon as practical, because the passphrase leaves the underlying seed unchanged.

Coindoo's August 21 Coldcard review lists the relevant models, firmware tracks and fixed releases. Holders ready to move funds should follow Coldcard's step-by-step migration guide, which covers a backup check, wallet-fingerprint verification, a small test transfer and final balance reconciliation. That sequence matters because the firmware update alone does not rekey funds already derived from the affected seed.

Recovery material should never be submitted to websites or shared in support messages. Coldcard states that users should never disclose seed words, passphrases, dice rolls, XPRVs, backup passwords or private-key QR codes. Anyone uncertain about the process should stop before erasing a device or sending a full balance.

Once the exposed funds are controlled by a fresh key, the holder can decide whether a multi-vendor setup fits the amount being protected and the recovery work it creates.

A 2-of-3 wallet still contains one compromised signer

A 2-of-3 wallet requires two authorized signatures for every spend. Possessing one key gives an attacker insufficient authority to move the bitcoin, provided the other signers and the wallet policy remain secure.

Three devices loaded with the same recovery phrase, however, still represent a single signer. Each device produces signatures from the same private keys, and the hardware brand has no effect on keys already derived from an imported phrase.

Three separately generated seeds produce three distinct signers. When one manufacturer created all three, the wallet also inherits that manufacturer's random-number generation, firmware and secure-element assumptions. Distributing key creation across several manufacturers reduces exposure to a flaw confined to one implementation.

Vendor names alone cannot prove full independence. Different products may rely on common software libraries, chips or coordinator applications. Seed provenance, setup records and on-device verification provide the evidence needed to understand those shared dependencies.

Unchained applied this threshold logic in its Coldcard security advisory. The multisig provider advised clients holding two Coldcard-generated user keys to create a new vault using fresh non-Coldcard keys. Unchained sells collaborative custody and benefits from wider multisig adoption, so the advisory is best read as operational experience from an interested provider.

Five questions to answer before funding a multisig wallet

1. Where was each seed generated? Record the manufacturer, device model, firmware version and setup date. Mark every imported seed with its original source.
2. Does each signer have separate recovery material? Cloned phrases are copies of one key. Seeds derived from one master, or from the same dice-only sequence, also share a common origin.
3. Did a connected computer see enough secrets to sign? Keep each phrase inside its own hardware signer and offline backup. Verify the policy and receiving address on the device screens.
4. Are the devices and backups physically separated? One fire, burglary or coercive event can reach every signer stored together. Coindoo's July 25 report on crypto home invasions explains why custody planning must include the people and locations connected to the keys.
5. Who can recover the wallet after one signer disappears? Instructions should cover device failure, death, incapacity and loss of access to an off-site location.

Resolve any missing answer before depositing a consequential balance.

Back up the wallet policy with the seeds

Multisig recovery requires the rules that combine several public keys into the correct Bitcoin addresses. BIP-380 explains that key backups can be insufficient when the wallet lacks its script type and derivation information. An output descriptor stores those details in a format supported by compatible wallet software.

The essential recovery record should contain:

• The signing policy, such as 2-of-3
• The address and script type
• The public output descriptor and its checksum
• Every signer's XPUB and master fingerprint
• The derivation path for each key
• Several protected copies of the complete record

Coldcard's multisig documentation shows how the policy, address format, derivation path, fingerprints and XPUBs define a wallet. Supporting notes can identify the coordinator software, the key-generation devices, the last recovery test and inheritance contacts.

Export a public descriptor containing XPUBs and treat it as sensitive financial metadata: it can reveal wallet addresses, balances and transaction history. A descriptor containing XPRVs carries spending authority and belongs with private-key material.

Keep exact backup locations in a separate, access-controlled record. A stolen document that identifies every signer and storage site can undermine the physical separation of the setup.

Run one recovery drill before the main deposit

Use a small amount of bitcoin and conduct the exercise with one signer unavailable:

1. Restore the watch-only wallet from the saved descriptor.
2. Confirm the policy, script type and signer fingerprints.
3. Verify the same receiving address on two signing devices.
4. Send a small test amount to the verified address.
5. Create, sign and broadcast a transaction using the available quorum.
6. Confirm the destination and correct any missing instructions.

Each seed should remain inside its own hardware signer throughout the drill. Collecting enough phrases to satisfy the policy on one connected computer gives that machine control of the wallet.

Run the exercise again after replacing a signer, changing the coordinator, moving a backup or updating the inheritance plan. Keep the previous recovery material until every transfer into the new policy is confirmed and reconciled.

Choosing between multisig and simpler custody

Multi-vendor multisig suits long-term holdings whose loss would cause serious harm, business reserves with defined signing responsibilities, and estates with a maintained inheritance process. The owner must be able to protect several records, reach the required locations and repeat the recovery drill.

A simpler wallet can serve active spending balances and replaceable amounts with less maintenance. Large holdings may justify professional help when the owner cannot confidently reconstruct the wallet or manage several signers.

A collaborative-custody plan combines an independently controlled provider key with recovery support, identity checks, service availability, fees and a governing legal jurisdiction. All terms should be reviewed before the wallet is funded.

What the Coldcard incident changes

A custody review can now begin with three records: the origin of every signer, the complete wallet descriptor and a dated recovery test. Missing information should be resolved before additional devices or larger balances make the setup harder to change.