Twenty business, industry, labor, and civil society groups in the Philippines issued a joint statement late last week urging Manila and Beijing to scale back their confrontational exchanges, specifically citing "inflammatory rhetoric, public recriminations, and social media exchanges." The groups called on the Philippine government to "pursue mutually beneficial economic opportunities through constructive engagement, while firmly upholding its sovereignty and national interests." [1]

The appeal came in the wake of a Nov. 3 phone call between Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa P. Lazaro and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi — a call made at Lazaro's request, according to China's Foreign Ministry. [2] The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) described the conversation as "frank, pragmatic and constructive" — diplospeak, in the view of BusinessWorld columnist Wilfredo G. Reyes, for a pointed exchange of views.

That was not the first time business groups raised the concern. Civil society organizations including CitizenWatch, Konsyumer at Mamamayan, Democracy Watch and Bantay Consumer, Kuryente, Kalsada have argued that economic cooperation and safeguarding the country's maritime rights are not contradictory priorities. CitizenWatch has pushed for diversifying trade in order to reduce overdependence on China.

The concern over deteriorating Philippine-China relations is understandable, Reyes wrote. China — when coupled with Hong Kong, which is otherwise counted separately in the official national accounts data — is the country's biggest trade partner, even though the latest available data (September 3) show South Korea displacing China as the biggest source of merchandise imports. China is also a key market hosting the overseas operations of major Philippine firms, and home to roughly 200,000 Filipinos working in the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau.

Reyes argued it is unfortunate that the current government risks ending its six-year term in mid-2028 with little to show in the country's relations with the world's second-biggest economy. Its predecessor, he noted, could not boast of any compelling, lasting benefit either — whether in terms of trade, investments, tourism, pledged economic assistance, or even Filipino fishermen's unhindered access to their traditional catch areas — despite bending over backward to accommodate Beijing's sensitivities during its time.

The exception, he wrote, is that the Philippines has widened awareness among many countries about Beijing's designs on the South China Sea. Reyes asked who, besides China, recognizes the nine-/10-dash line there, and noted that other countries — whether acting on their own or in joint patrols and maneuvers with the Philippines — helped implement the 2016 arbitral ruling, which China alone has rejected.

Whatever else transpired in the Lazaro-Wang call beyond the details both sides have so far cared to disclose publicly, he added, any such high-level dialogue is preferable to having none at all.

Spoil the Broth

Having said that, Reyes expressed hope that the administration does not leave Philippine-China relations where they now stand when it steps down, and that it has a game plan to at least give its 2028 successor a good foundation on which to mend torn bilateral ties and rebuild from there.

At the same time, one should not hope for an immediate cessation of tensions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) to accompany any improvement in ties. Signs of India-China rapprochement that emerged in 2024 after a four-year diplomatic freeze have still been occasionally accompanied by border clashes — the latest round of which began in July and continues to simmer — that have left scores of troops on both sides wounded. Vietnam, which has actually been an active "island" builder in the South China Sea without much Chinese interference, has had its own experience learning to deal with its giant northern neighbor across their border after their last maritime clash in 1988-1989. Reyes suggested the Philippines should already be exchanging notes with Indian and Vietnamese foreign, defense, and trade experts in order to learn from their experiences.

In his view, 2027 should be the year the Marcos administration lays the groundwork and sets the right conditions for the country's own rapprochement with China from 2028 onward.

Where does one start? By identifying where the Philippines could meet China midway without compromising its own "red lines," especially in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), while at the same time sharpening its messaging to Beijing by making it more unified.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry's latest statement, Reyes observed, reads like a unilateral list of demands the Philippines must meet if it wants relations to improve — and is silent on what China itself can do to serve that end. Topping the list is a demand to muzzle "[a] handful of Philippine politicians, driven by political bias and selfish gains, [who] have repeatedly attacked and smeared China, crossed China's red lines, politicized normal economic, trade, people to people and cultural exchanges, and infringed upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals and institutions in the Philippines."

The immediate reflex after reading such a statement, he wrote, is to chide Beijing for thinking it can throw its weight around and expect other countries to comply — before handing out mere candy to those found compliant, as it did with the past administration. Since Beijing is surely aware of how democracies work, at least in principle, this smacks of sheer arrogance on the back of its economic and military might.

One Voice

Perhaps it is time, Reyes suggested, for the Executive branch to have just one talking head on the tortuous, delicate path to bilateral rapprochement. Each department has its core function and mission, with foreign policy belonging to the DFA and, ultimately, to Malacañang. Departments such as Defense and Trade are generally considered part of the wider foreign policy sector — which could also embrace business interest groups and the academe in a broader grouping — but each has unique roles to play.

Even from a simple communication standpoint, it is easier to understand, avoid misunderstandings with, and deal with a party that speaks with one voice. While the country's articulate Defense chief and the Coast Guard spokesman for the West Philippine Sea have backed the steadfast stance in the EEZ — showing that the Philippines is not a pushover — it is time to stop sending mixed signals in dealing with Beijing, he argued. Let the DFA and Malacañang do the talking from here on in on anything pertaining to Philippine-China relations.

Allowing the defense sector — loosely including the coast guard, which otherwise falls under the Transport department — to speak on the matter could risk couching it in the context of armed confrontation, a prospect both sides hope to avoid.

Our Slip Is Showing

At the same time, everyone in the foreign policy sector should be on the same page regarding objectives and next steps in dealing with Beijing. Yet Reyes noted that debilitating turf wars and compartmentalization persist in the sector, with one party not knowing what others are doing.

Signs of just such a turf war flared into the open when the DFA — which, Reyes said he has heard, has its own internal high-level rifts — issued a Nov. 9 press release that scored unnamed "certain government officials" for their criticism of China, saying that "[p]ersonal advocacies must never serve interests other than the national interest." [4]

Reyes questioned the premise: the statement implies that personal, rather than national, interests primarily drive those speaking out against China's aggression. He acknowledged that social media posts have pushed the Defense chief to consider a presidential run in 2028, but argued that apparently hinting at that in an official statement to be picked up by media is another matter altogether — and asked what about all the other officials who criticize Beijing.

"They risk eroding the country's credibility in international affairs and project an image of internal division that external parties can exploit," the release stated.

That assessment is correct, Reyes wrote — so why air such dirty linen in public instead of fixing divisions discreetly? What was the point of that unusual press statement that could not have been advanced better behind closed doors? He suggested Beijing's strategists could now be plotting with glee on how to exploit the overt rift between the front-line foreign affairs and defense sectors.

This prerequisite is so vital, and the interdepartmental turf war so acute, that it may take no less than the president this time to step in, settle the quarrel, and force productive cooperation, he concluded.

Game Plan

Hence, there should be just one foreign policy voice in the Executive branch — but that one voice should be the result of constant, extensive consultations with all other departments with a say in ties with China.

Corollary to having one voice is drawing up — again through consultations with the Defense, Trade, and other departments, as well as private sector experts — a game plan complete with a menu of things to offer China in exchange for its own concessions. As an example: if Beijing is hurting from the Philippines' highly effective "transparency initiative," which documents and publicizes cases of Chinese maritime aggression, Manila could offer to suspend it — provided China, including its maritime militia, stops encroaching on the Philippine EEZ (even where it has built artificial islands) and refrains from harassing Filipino fishermen. If Beijing wants the suspension of joint WPS patrols with other countries, what can it offer in return? And so on. Failure to live up to commitments would risk reviving those Philippine initiatives.

The road to rapprochement will be tricky, Reyes acknowledged, as election campaigns heat up next year, with WPS tensions and the suspected collusion of a few political leaders with Beijing expected to gain greater prominence in public fora.

And as the Philippines takes these immediate steps to hopefully put its relations with China back on track, he argued it is just as vital to persevere in boosting overall strategic resilience and agility: further diversifying trade (hopefully, South Korea's supplanting of China as the top import source in September was a sign of that); further easing the cost of doing business in order to attract more foreign direct investments; making a significant dent in graft and corruption to ensure public funds truly go to projects that will support economic activity and reduce poverty; modernizing the armed forces to build a credible deterrence capability; upgrading human capital through better healthcare and education; and updating the 85-year-old anti-espionage law, Commonwealth Act No. 616, among other measures.

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Wilfredo G. Reyes was editor-in-chief of BusinessWorld from 2020 through 2023.

Source: BusinessWorld