Why Binance's 'Kill Switch' Couldn't Stop Hackers From Draining $6.3 Billion
Key Takeaways
- •Attackers infiltrated Binance months before the theft through a supply-chain attack involving a tampered AI coding tool package and a fictitious recruitment process targeting employees.
- •The thieves exploited Ethereum's EIP-7702 delegation mechanism to gain code execution rights over a hot wallet, and those on-chain permissions remained valid even after Binance suspended withdrawals and shut down its hot-wallet services.
- •Binance's multi-party computation wallet architecture left no single private key available to revoke the malicious delegation immediately, requiring engineers to develop a specialized revocation procedure during the incident.
- •Binance reported freezing approximately $2.85 billion in stolen funds and replenishing roughly 98% of affected holdings by 4 November, while attackers converted about $325 million of stablecoins into assets like Ether within roughly 20 minutes to evade issuer freezes.
- •Chainalysis estimated Binance's total loss at around $6.4 billion, more than four times the approximately $1.5 billion stolen from Bybit in its February 2025 compromise of the Safe{Wallet} approval environment.

Why Binance's 'Kill Switch' Couldn't Stop Hackers From Draining $6.3 Billion
There is a certain irony in pulling the emergency brake, only to discover that the machinery you are trying to stop is operating beyond your reach. Binance encountered an expensive version of that problem on 29 October, when attackers compromised its wallet signing infrastructure and obtained the authority to move cryptocurrency through mechanisms that did not depend on the exchange's ordinary withdrawal process.
Suspending withdrawals could interrupt that process. It could do considerably less about permissions the attackers had already established on Ethereum. By the time the attack was contained, approximately $6.3 billion had been stolen, and Binance's engineers had developed a specialised procedure to revoke the malicious on-chain authority. The exchange could shut down affected services, but Ethereum would continue recognising the delegation until it was explicitly cleared.
Know when your coins move
Brian Cubellis, Chief Strategy Officer at Bitcoin custody platform Onramp, described the distinction to AMBCrypto:
"Pausing withdrawals turns off the exchange's own software, but it does nothing about permissions the attacker has already written to the blockchain."
That distinction is an uncomfortable one for an institution entrusted with billions in customer assets. Binance subsequently coordinated freezes of stolen funds and began replenishing the affected holdings, reporting approximately 98% replenishment by 4 November. Its financial response was substantial. What remained possible while its emergency controls were taking effect, however, is still worth examining.
The permission that would not disappear
The attack began well before 29 October, and nowhere near a blockchain. According to Binance's 3 November incident report, an engineer downloaded a tampered installation package for an AI coding tool in June. The exchange detected the anomaly and replaced the device, but by then the attackers had already gathered intelligence about its employees and infrastructure.
Well into September, another engineer was approached through a fictitious recruitment process involving interviews and a malicious coding assignment. By 20 October, the attackers had used compromised employee systems and internal AI tooling to access additional machines, ultimately obtaining credentials that opened the way to Binance's wallet signing infrastructure. The sequence — a tampered developer tool, a fictitious hiring pipeline, staged access through employee machines — fits what security practitioners call a supply-chain attack, in which intruders compromise the tools and trust relationships surrounding a target rather than its outward-facing defences.
It all paid off on the 29th. Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, hot wallets — internet-connected wallets used to process customer deposits and withdrawals — transferred approximately 223.46 million XRP, 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP to attacker-controlled addresses. Bitcoin and other assets followed. Chainalysis subsequently estimated the overall theft at approximately $6.4 billion, a figure that would place the incident among the largest thefts recorded in the crypto industry.
The most consequential part of the intrusion was that the attackers gained access to Binance's signing infrastructure — the very machinery responsible for authorizing transactions — and then used that trust against it.
On Ethereum, the attackers exploited EIP-7702, a mechanism introduced in Ethereum's 2025 Pectra upgrade that allows an externally owned account to delegate execution to smart-contract code. Ordinarily, that flexibility expands what a wallet can do. Here, according to Binance, the compromised signing infrastructure was used to grant malicious code execution rights over an Ethereum hot wallet. The exchange described 50 signed transactions involved in manipulating the account's nonce — the counter Ethereum uses to order an account's transactions — and establishing the delegation.
The unsettling part came next: those permissions remained valid on-chain even after Binance suspended withdrawals and shut down its hot-wallet services. The exchange could stop its own systems from processing transactions, but it could not simply switch off the authority the attackers had already established on Ethereum.
Then came another complication. Binance's hot wallet used multi-party computation (MPC), which distributes the production of cryptographic signatures across multiple participants or components rather than relying on a single conventional private key. That architecture can reduce certain risks, but it also meant there was no single private key available to revoke the malicious delegation immediately. Binance's engineers had to develop a specialised revocation procedure while the incident was unfolding, and doing so took additional time, prolonging the effort to contain unauthorized asset movements.
At 23:56 UTC, the final reported unauthorized Ethereum transfer, involving 2,961.9 ETH, was confirmed on-chain. Binance said it had been broadcast earlier and remained pending before confirmation. At 00:10 UTC on 30 October, the exchange cleared the malicious EIP-7702 delegation with a new authorization to the zero address.
The distinction between broadcast and confirmation matters. So does the absence of an established total for funds transferred after withdrawals were suspended. Binance acknowledged that suspension alone could not stop every unauthorized movement, but its disclosures do not establish a reconciled post-suspension loss figure. A reconciled total for that period is the number to watch in any follow-up disclosure.
A kill switch with conditions attached
There is a comforting simplicity to the idea of a kill switch: something goes wrong, someone pulls the plug, and the damage stops. Unfortunately, the blockchain has no particular obligation to respect an exchange's internal emergency procedures.
Consider a hotel discovering that someone has obtained an unauthorized key card. Closing reception prevents new cards from being issued; the existing card still opens the door. Cancelling it, securing the valuables, and recovering what has already disappeared are separate jobs. The comparison has its limits, but it captures the dilemma facing exchanges whose wallet permissions outlive their own systems.
The problem surfaced in a public exchange between Haseeb Qureshi, Managing Partner at Dragonfly, and Tudor Anastasiu, a blockchain infrastructure and security engineer and the founder of Anastasiu Labs. Their disagreement exposes a distinction that is easy to overlook in the middle of a breach. A defensive sweep can move assets to safety, provided the exchange can authorize and execute it before the attacker does. However, moving funds does not necessarily invalidate permissions already granted on-chain, and it certainly cannot retrieve assets that have already disappeared.
That leaves an awkward question: if the signing infrastructure itself has been compromised, how does an exchange authorize an emergency transaction without trusting the very system it suspects?
Carlos Vendrell, founder of Zealynx Security, sees the answer in testing the procedure under exactly those conditions:
"The drill should start from a list of every approval and delegation each hot wallet has given, then revoke one of them for real while assuming the normal signing service is the compromised part, and time it."
Binance's experience does not establish that MPC inherently prevents rapid revocation, nor does its disclosure prove that no emergency procedure existed before the breach. It does establish that engineers developed a specialised procedure during the incident, and that doing so took additional time.
The wallet that kept getting fed
There was another complication, one that made the situation look almost absurd: the compromised wallet was reportedly still receiving money.
In an analysis dated 4 November, Four Pillars reported that Binance's deposit-consolidation system continued collecting funds into a compromised Ethereum wallet identified as Binance 14. This allowed the attacker to sweep newly arriving assets.
Nexus Mutual's reconstruction offers a particularly striking sequence. At approximately 21:44 UTC, the attacker swept 200 million USDT that another Binance-labelled wallet had deposited roughly 72 seconds earlier. Seventy-two seconds — barely enough time to make a cup of coffee, yet apparently sufficient for a fresh transfer to reach a compromised address and disappear.
The researchers' findings raise a problem distinct from EIP-7702. An exchange can work to revoke an attacker's authority while other operational systems continue directing funds towards a dangerous destination. Interrupting those internal asset flows is another containment task, and it requires its own controls and confirmation.
According to Cubellis, emergency preparedness must account for the loss of the usual signing infrastructure:
"An exchange should prove, before it is attacked, that it can cancel any permission on its wallets and move exposed funds to safety even if its own signing system has been taken over."
That is easier prescribed than engineered. An independent emergency signing path may accelerate recovery, but it also introduces powerful authority that must be secured. Build too much dependence into the ordinary system and the emergency route may fail alongside it; concentrate too much authority in the alternative and the supposed safeguard becomes another attractive target.
Money moves faster than the paperwork
Once stolen assets leave the exchange's immediate control, containment becomes a race involving investigators, stablecoin issuers, blockchain networks and the attacker.
Chainalysis's investigation also described an attempt to move approximately $500 million in stablecoins through a swapping address. Within roughly 20 minutes, the attackers reportedly converted around $325 million into assets less susceptible to issuer freezes, including Ether. The remaining $175 million was frozen.
There was a reason for the rush. Stablecoin issuers such as Tether and Circle can freeze certain tokens at designated addresses. Bitcoin and Ether, by contrast, have no equivalent central issuer with that power. Converting the stolen stablecoins into other assets could therefore put them beyond the reach of an issuer-imposed freeze.
The episode illustrates the limits of intervention once funds have escaped. Investigators may be able to follow the money on-chain, but knowing where it has gone does not necessarily give them the power to retrieve it.
Binance nevertheless managed to secure a substantial portion of the stolen assets. In its 3 November report, the exchange said that approximately $2.85 billion had been frozen or intercepted through cooperation with issuers, law enforcement and blockchain intelligence firms. By 4 November, it reported replenishing approximately 98% of the affected holdings through replacement purchases.
Binance demonstrated considerable capacity to absorb the losses rather than pass them on to users. But those figures describe how much the exchange managed to secure or replace — not how effectively it prevented the attacker from continuing to move assets during the breach.
When valid signatures authorize a theft
A year earlier, Bybit had encountered a different version of the problem of compromised transaction authority. In February 2025, attackers stole approximately $1.5 billion after compromising the environment associated with its Safe{Wallet} approval process. According to Bybit's forensic disclosure, malicious changes deceived signers into approving an unauthorized transaction, and investigators found no indication that Bybit's own infrastructure had been compromised. The scale separates the two cases as well: Chainalysis's roughly $6.4 billion estimate for Binance is more than four times the approximate $1.5 billion taken from Bybit.
Both incidents exposed how much depends on the integrity of the authority behind a transaction. Multiple signatures offer limited protection when signers are misled about what they are approving. And as Binance discovered, shutting down a signing service does not necessarily invalidate authority already established on-chain.
What does the "kill switch" actually kill?
An emergency kill switch sounds reassuring. Rather less reassuring is discovering, halfway through a breach, that the attacker holds permissions the switch cannot revoke.
Binance's experience raises an uncomfortable question for exchanges entrusted with billions in customer assets: have they actually tested what happens when the systems responsible for protecting those assets become part of the attack? An exchange should be able to demonstrate that it can revoke compromised permissions, move exposed assets to safety, and interrupt internal transfers without relying entirely on infrastructure it can no longer trust.
What, then, should customers make of an exchange's public assurances while a breach is underway? AMBCrypto put that question to Vik Sharma, Founder and CEO of Cake Wallet:
"A useful update names which approvals were revoked, which assets moved, and where, so customers can check it themselves."
There are legitimate reasons to withhold sensitive operational details while an intrusion is underway. Once the immediate danger has passed, however, an exchange should be able to explain what its emergency controls actually stopped, when compromised authority was extinguished, and whether any assets remained exposed.
Binance deserves credit for publishing details of its response, coordinating substantial asset freezes, and committing its own resources to replenish affected holdings. Those measures helped absorb the financial damage. They also revealed why reimbursement and containment should never be confused. A kill switch should buy defenders control — not merely time to figure out where control has gone.
Binance's signing infrastructure, unbeknownst to the exchange, was compromised well before the hack. Together with the Bybit episode, it stands as a reminder that much depends on the integrity of the authority behind a transaction.