B² Network Faces $3.86 Million Token Drain as Attacker Sells 8.59M B2
Key Takeaways
- •The drained 8.59 million B2 represented about 4.1% of the token’s capped 210 million supply.
- •The attacker sold the full B2 amount for 5,409 BNB at an average price of roughly $0.35 per token.
- •The proceeds were moved from BNB Chain to Ethereum and later routed through NEAR Intents and HOT Protocol.
- •B² Network had not publicly disclosed an affected contract, recovery plan, user instructions or the origin of the transferred tokens at publication.
- •The incident followed other recent cross-chain security events involving AFX Trade, Wanchain and 42DAO.

B² Network appears to have experienced a token drain involving 8.59 million B2, valued at about $3.86 million before the assets were sold on BNB Chain.
Lookonchain traced the transactions after the tokens moved to an address controlled by the attacker. The entire amount was swapped for 5,409 BNB, worth approximately $3.01 million, indicating about $850,000 in slippage and price impact during the sale. Large swaps can move execution prices when available liquidity is insufficient to absorb the order near the quoted market price.
The swap resulted in an average sale price of roughly $0.35 per B2, below the token’s approximately $0.45 price when the assets were first identified. B2 traded near $0.45 on Thursday after the transfers.
The drained tokens account for about 4.1% of B2’s capped supply of 210 million tokens. B2 is used for governance, staking and network activity across B² Network, a Bitcoin Layer-2 ecosystem with applications in decentralized finance, mining and artificial intelligence. Because the token is tied to participation across the network, the origin of the transfer is central to determining whether the incident was limited to a wallet-level compromise or involved infrastructure such as a contract, bridge or treasury account.
Funds Moved From BNB Chain to Ethereum
After selling the B2, the attacker bridged the BNB proceeds to Ethereum and converted them into ETH and USDT. The assets were later deposited into NEAR Intents and HOT Protocol, two cross-chain services that can route funds across multiple networks and assets.
The use of those services makes the latest balances more difficult to track through a single wallet. However, the activity does not establish that either platform was compromised. The transaction path began with the B2 transfer and sale before the proceeds entered cross-chain infrastructure.
At publication, no incident notice, affected contract, recovery plan or user instructions had appeared on B² Network’s public announcement channel. The project had also not identified whether the tokens originated from a bridge, treasury, staking contract or compromised wallet.
Without a technical review from B² Network or an independent security firm, the authorization path behind the 8.59 million-token transfer remains unconfirmed. Further disclosures would be needed to verify how the transfer was approved, whether any remaining token reserves or contracts are affected, and whether exchanges, bridges or service providers have been asked to monitor related addresses.
Token Drain Follows Week of Bridge Exploits
The B² transfers followed an incident in which an attacker withdrew $24.15 million in USDC from AFX Trade’s Arbitrum bridge using approvals linked to five hot validators. Those funds were bridged to Ethereum and converted into 12,467 ETH.
Wanchain also disabled its Cardano-BNB Chain bridge after 515 million NIGHT left its treasury through transactions tied to a suspected signature-reuse vulnerability.
Separately, a $915,000 oracle exploit at 42DAO pushed Balance Coin more than 99% below its dollar target after manipulated BTCB pricing triggered vault liquidations and undercollateralized token issuance.
The incidents highlight recurring operational risks around cross-chain systems, including validator key management, bridge authorization flows, oracle inputs and the challenge of tracing assets once proceeds move through multiple networks and routing protocols.