NewsCryptoAttackers Hijack 64,000 Bitcoin Mining Machines, Briefly Pushing OCEAN Hashrate Near 50 EH/s

Attackers Hijack 64,000 Bitcoin Mining Machines, Briefly Pushing OCEAN Hashrate Near 50 EH/s

Author: Blockonomi·

Key Takeaways

  • •Approximately 64,000 Bitcoin mining machines, totaling about 13 EH/s of hashrate, were reportedly redirected to the OCEAN pool beginning around 8 p.m. U.S. Central Time on November 14.
  • •OCEAN's dashboard hashrate briefly approached 50 EH/s due to the hijacked fleet before settling at 41.59 EH/s, with the surge reflecting diverted machines rather than organic growth.
  • •Attackers modified payout settings to send potential block rewards to their own Bitcoin address but failed to mine a single block during the incident.
  • •CoreX Hosting reported the attack ended on November 15, with diverted computing power dropping more than 99%, from about 13 EH/s to 100 PH/s.
  • •An affected operator identified Luxor's Commander fleet-management software as the suspected source of the compromise, though neither the breach nor the attack's full scope has been independently confirmed.
Attackers Hijack 64,000 Bitcoin Mining Machines, Briefly Pushing OCEAN Hashrate Near 50 EH/s

Approximately 64,000 Bitcoin mining machines were reportedly hijacked after attackers redirected about 13 exahashes per second (EH/s) of computing power to the OCEAN mining pool. The machines, previously pointed at other pools, were reconfigured to hash for OCEAN without their operators' consent, briefly inflating the pool's measured performance. The attackers also altered the payout settings to route potential block rewards to a Bitcoin address under their own control, although they failed to collect any block rewards during the incident.

The reported hijack was flagged by industry account Wu Blockchain on X:

64,000 Bitcoin Mining Machines Hijacked, Redirecting 13 EH/s to OCEAN Pool — Bitcoin News reported that approximately 64,000 Bitcoin mining machines, representing about 13 EH/s of hashrate, were hijacked around 20:00 U.S. Central Time on November 14. The attackers redirected the… pic.twitter.com/wvUyDmXO6v

— Wu Blockchain (@WuBlockchain) November 15, 2026

According to Wu Blockchain, the attack began at approximately 8 p.m. U.S. Central Time on November 14. Mining infrastructure provider CoreX Hosting subsequently raised the alarm after detecting unauthorized changes to mining pool configurations on affected machines. In a single stroke, the changes redirected both the compromised machines' hashing power and their reward payouts.

Hijacked Hashrate Pushes OCEAN Near 50 EH/s

Data from OCEAN's mining dashboard showed a sudden surge in computing power as the attackers steered the compromised machines toward the pool. The pool's hashrate briefly approached 50 EH/s before retreating toward 40 EH/s, and the dashboard subsequently displayed a reading of 41.59 EH/s. OCEAN's measured share of the network therefore climbed for reasons unrelated to any organic growth in mining capacity.

A pool's displayed hashrate reflects only the machines actively submitting work to it, so the hijacked fleet inflated OCEAN's headline figures without adding any new computing capacity to the Bitcoin network. For scale, the diverted 13 EH/s was equivalent to roughly a third of the pool's subsequent dashboard reading of 41.59 EH/s.

The attackers attempted to monetize the hijacked infrastructure by directing potential mining rewards to their own Bitcoin address. As a result, affected operators lost the opportunity to generate revenue through their intended mining pools during the attack window, even as their machines continued operating.

CoreX Hosting later reported that the attack appeared to have ended on November 15. The diverted computing power fell from approximately 13 EH/s to 100 petahashes per second (PH/s), a reduction of more than 99%.

Suspected Luxor Commander Breach Raises Mining Security Questions

One affected mining operator reported that its entire mining farm had been hijacked and identified Luxor's Commander mining management software as the suspected source of the compromise. Other operators reported similar unauthorized changes to their pool configurations several days before the latest incident, suggesting the unauthorized access may have been underway before the mass redirection came to light.

Fleet-management platforms of this kind let operators control pool assignments and payout addresses across thousands of machines from a single interface, concentrating the ability to reconfigure entire farms in one place. That helps explain how pool and payout settings could be flipped for tens of thousands of machines in a single stroke — and why unauthorized edits to such dashboards translate directly into diverted revenue.

Those accounts raised questions about whether the security breach extended beyond the machines identified in the initial reports. However, neither the full extent of the attack nor the alleged compromise of Luxor Commander has received independent confirmation.

Attackers Fail to Mine a Block

Despite gaining control of substantial computing resources, the attackers reportedly failed to mine a single Bitcoin block during the incident and therefore received no block rewards over the reported attack period. Because Bitcoin blocks are discovered probabilistically, even a temporary allocation of computing power at this scale carried no guarantee of yielding a block reward.

Affected operators nevertheless lost valuable hashing time that could have generated revenue through their original pools. Unlike temporarily redirected computing power, the lost mining time cannot be recovered. The available reports did not quantify the financial losses or establish the total number of mining facilities affected. With the suspected Luxor Commander breach unconfirmed and no complete tally of affected facilities, the incident's ultimate scope remains open — as does how long the unauthorized access persisted before the November 14 mass redirection brought it to light.

This article originally appeared on Blockonomi.