De Verenigde Staten staan op het punt hun handelsconflict met een breed scala aan landen uit te breiden door Section 301 te gebruiken om “structurele overcapaciteit” aan te klagen, die volgens Washington wordt veroorzaakt door overheidsingrijpen. China is een van de doelwitten, volgens Bloomberg:

The US is set to impose a 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods over allegations of excess manufacturing capacity before a planned summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump next month, according to people familiar with the matter. The move would restore Trump’s second-term duties on China to around 20%, a level Beijing has previously said is consistent with its trade truce with Washington. Those come on top of other levies imposed during Trump’s first term and extended during the Biden administration.

The US is set to impose a 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods over allegations of excess manufacturing capacity before a planned summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump next month, according to people familiar with the matter. The move would restore Trump’s second-term duties on China to around 20%, a level Beijing has previously said is consistent with its trade truce with Washington. Those come on top of other levies imposed during Trump’s first term and extended during the Biden administration.

De ontwikkeling was al voorzien in Brookings’ “After IEEPA”, gepubliceerd in maart.

Sixteen investigations announced March 11 focus on what the administration calls “structural excess capacity.” USTR contends that certain countries—including China, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, India, Switzerland, Norway, and others—maintain government policies such as subsidies, state financing, and industrial planning that allow factories to keep producing even when market conditions do not support it.

Sixteen investigations announced March 11 focus on what the administration calls “structural excess capacity.” USTR contends that certain countries—including China, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, India, Switzerland, Norway, and others—maintain government policies such as subsidies, state financing, and industrial planning that allow factories to keep producing even when market conditions do not support it.

De term “excess capacity” is er niet een die de auteur zich herinnert uit cursussen internationale handel, zowel undergraduate als graduate. Een verwijzing in een standaardleerboek leverde geen resultaat op.

Dat betekent niet dat de term geen plaats heeft in de economie. In modellen van monopolistische concurrentie komt excess capacity expliciet voor, al werden die besprekingen oorspronkelijk geplaatst in een zuiver binnenlandse, gesloten-economiecontext.

Als “excess capacity” simpelweg betekent dat een land niet zoveel produceert als het zou kunnen, rijst de vraag waar de drempel ligt. In de Federal Register-mededeling over de Section 301-onderzoeken lijkt het antwoord 80% te zijn.

In 2024 genereerde de wereldwijde industrie $16.6 trillion dollars aan economische output, een stijging ten opzichte van $16.4 trillion in 2023, volgens gegevens van de World Bank. Niettemin blijft volgens schattingen van de Amerikaanse overheid de wereldwijde bezettingsgraad van de industriële capaciteit tussen 75.0 en 75.9 percent, onder gezonde bezettingsgraden voor veel sectoren van ongeveer 80 percent.2 Dit is een aanwijzing dat, voor industriële goederen, hoewel de wereldwijde productie groeit, het onderliggende mondiale aanbod groter is dan de onderliggende mondiale vraag.

In 2024 genereerde de wereldwijde industrie $16.6 trillion dollars aan economische output, een stijging ten opzichte van $16.4 trillion in 2023, volgens gegevens van de World Bank. Niettemin blijft volgens schattingen van de Amerikaanse overheid de wereldwijde bezettingsgraad van de industriële capaciteit tussen 75.0 en 75.9 percent, onder gezonde bezettingsgraden voor veel sectoren van ongeveer 80 percent.2 Dit is een aanwijzing dat, voor industriële goederen, hoewel de wereldwijde productie groeit, het onderliggende mondiale aanbod groter is dan de onderliggende mondiale vraag.

De 80%-norm lijkt ontleend te zijn aan de literatuur over overcapaciteit in de staalsector.

De kwestie verschuift vervolgens van handelstheorie naar handelsrecht, die niet altijd op één lijn liggen, zoals het antidumpingrecht laat zien. USTR lijkt structurele overcapaciteit ook anders te definiëren dan in de 2025 National Trade Estimate Report.

Zoals Global Trade Alert opmerkt:

The definitional scope is measurable. In the 2025 National Trade Estimate Report, published a year earlier, USTR discussed overcapacity for two economies : China (steel, aluminium, solar, electric vehicles, batteries) and Indonesia (mineral ore export bans contributing to steel overcapacity). The Section 301 announcement applies ‘structural excess capacity’ to 16 economies. USTR’s Background section defines two analytical layers: evidentiary indicators (trade surpluses, low capacity utilisation, sector overcapacity, unprofitable firms) and seven policy interventions said to cause them (production subsidies, wage suppression, state-owned enterprise activities, market access barriers, lax environmental or labour protection, subsidised lending, and currency manipulation). Across all 16 economies, the announcement documents 33 evidentiary indicators but cites only seven specific policy interventions. For ten economies, it identifies symptoms but leaves the causes subject to investigation. Three economies illustrate the breadth of the definition. Switzerland is cited for currency intervention and sterilisation of foreign exchange inflows, with no industrial overcapacity evidence and no policy interventions identified beyond currency practices. The NTE’s Switzerland chapter discusses tariffs, agricultural subsidies, sanitary measures, and data localisation; it contains no mention of overcapacity, currency manipulation, or trade surplus as a concern. Norway is cited for recycling oil revenues through its sovereign wealth fund rather than its domestic currency; its bilateral surplus with the United States is $1.9 billion. The NTE’s Norway chapter contains no reference to currency practices, sovereign wealth operations, or overcapacity. Japan runs a global goods trade deficit of roughly $36 billion but is included on the basis of its bilateral surplus and the share of unprofitable firms in its economy. Divergence from the National Trade Estimate Report The S301 and the NTE diverge significantly. A systematic review of the 2025 NTE across all 16 targeted economy chapters finds that the S301’s core categories scarcely appear in the NTE’s analytical vocabulary. Neither currency intervention, undervaluation, nor zombie firms feature as concerns anywhere in the document. ‘Overcapacity’ is confined almost entirely to the China section and one brief Indonesia reference. The divergence extends to policy causes: the NTE documents instances of USTR’s own seven policy interventions far more extensively than the S301 does. Market access barriers, for instance, are documented in the NTE for 15 of the 16 targeted economies; the S301 does not cite market access barriers as a cause of overcapacity for any of them, though some country sections describe practices (such as Indonesia’s export restrictions) that could plausibly be characterised under that heading. The NTE is a document about the causes of trade distortion. The S301, at this stage, documents indicators and leaves most causes unspecified. The definitional scope is measurable. In the 2025 National Trade Estimate Report, published a year earlier, USTR discussed overcapacity for two economies : China (steel, aluminium, solar, electric vehicles, batteries) and Indonesia (mineral ore export bans contributing to steel overcapacity). The Section 301 announcement applies ‘structural excess capacity’ to 16 economies. USTR’s Background section defines two analytical layers: evidentiary indicators (trade surpluses, low capacity utilisation, sector overcapacity, unprofitable firms) and seven policy interventions said to cause them (production subsidies, wage suppression, state-owned enterprise activities, market access barriers, lax environmental or labour protection, subsidised lending, and currency manipulation). Across all 16 economies, the announcement documents 33 evidentiary indicators but cites only seven specific policy interventions. For ten economies, it identifies symptoms but leaves the causes subject to investigation. Three economies illustrate the breadth of the definition. Switzerland is cited for currency intervention and sterilisation of foreign exchange inflows, with no industrial overcapacity evidence and no policy interventions identified beyond currency practices. The NTE’s Switzerland chapter discusses tariffs, agricultural subsidies, sanitary measures, and data localisation; it contains no mention of overcapacity, currency manipulation, or trade surplus as a concern. Norway is cited for recycling oil revenues through its sovereign wealth fund rather than its domestic currency; its bilateral surplus with the United States is $1.9 billion. The NTE’s Norway chapter contains no reference to currency practices, sovereign wealth operations, or overcapacity. Japan runs a global goods trade deficit of roughly $36 billion but is included on the basis of its bilateral surplus and the share of unprofitable firms in its economy. Divergence from the National Trade Estimate Report The S301 and the NTE diverge significantly. A systematic review of the 2025 NTE across all 16 targeted economy chapters finds that the S301’s core categories scarcely appear in the NTE’s analytical vocabulary. Neither currency intervention, undervaluation, nor zombie firms feature as concerns anywhere in the document. ‘Overcapacity’ is confined almost entirely to the China section and one brief Indonesia reference. The divergence extends to policy causes: the NTE documents instances of USTR’s own seven policy interventions far more extensively than the S301 does. Market access barriers, for instance, are documented in the NTE for 15 of the 16 targeted economies; the S301 does not cite market access barriers as a cause of overcapacity for any of them, though some country sections describe practices (such as Indonesia’s export restrictions) that could plausibly be characterised under that heading. The NTE is a document about the causes of trade distortion. The S301, at this stage, documents indicators and leaves most causes unspecified.

Het is ook vermeldenswaard dat er verschillende sectoren zijn waarin de bezettingsgraad van de capaciteit onder 80% ligt en wordt geëxporteerd.

Meer discussie van Evenett is hier beschikbaar, in de context van de Verenigde Staten en China.