Estados Unidos ampliará su conflicto comercial con un amplio grupo de países mediante el uso de la Sección 301 para acusar una “capacidad excedente estructural”, que dice está impulsada por la intervención del gobierno. China está entre los objetivos, según Bloomberg:

The US is set to impose a 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods over allegations of excess manufacturing capacity before a planned summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump next month, according to people familiar with the matter. The move would restore Trump’s second-term duties on China to around 20%, a level Beijing has previously said is consistent with its trade truce with Washington. Those come on top of other levies imposed during Trump’s first term and extended during the Biden administration.

The US is set to impose a 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods over allegations of excess manufacturing capacity before a planned summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump next month, according to people familiar with the matter. The move would restore Trump’s second-term duties on China to around 20%, a level Beijing has previously said is consistent with its trade truce with Washington. Those come on top of other levies imposed during Trump’s first term and extended during the Biden administration.

El desarrollo fue anticipado en “After IEEPA” de Brookings, publicado en marzo.

Dieciséis investigaciones anunciadas el 11 de marzo se centran en lo que la administración llama “capacidad excedente estructural”. La USTR sostiene que ciertos países —incluidos China, la Unión Europea, Japón, México, India, Suiza, Noruega y otros— mantienen políticas gubernamentales como subsidios, financiamiento estatal y planificación industrial que permiten que las fábricas sigan produciendo incluso cuando las condiciones del mercado no lo respaldan.

Dieciséis investigaciones anunciadas el 11 de marzo se centran en lo que la administración llama “capacidad excedente estructural”. La USTR sostiene que ciertos países —incluidos China, la Unión Europea, Japón, México, India, Suiza, Noruega y otros— mantienen políticas gubernamentales como subsidios, financiamiento estatal y planificación industrial que permiten que las fábricas sigan produciendo incluso cuando las condiciones del mercado no lo respaldan.

El término “excess capacity” no es uno que el autor recuerde de cursos de comercio internacional, ni de licenciatura ni de posgrado. Buscar una referencia en un libro de texto estándar no arrojó coincidencias.

Eso no significa que la frase no tenga lugar en la economía. En los modelos de competencia monopolística, la capacidad excedente aparece de forma explícita, aunque esas discusiones se plantearon originalmente en un contexto doméstico, de economía cerrada.

Si “capacidad excedente” simplemente significa que un país no produce tanto como podría, la pregunta pasa a ser cuál es el umbral. En el aviso del Federal Register sobre las investigaciones de la Sección 301, la respuesta parece ser 80%.

En 2024, la manufactura mundial generó $16.6 trillion dollars en producción económica, frente a $16.4 trillion en 2023, según datos del World Bank. No obstante, según estimaciones del gobierno de Estados Unidos, la utilización de la capacidad manufacturera mundial se mantiene entre 75.0 y 75.9 percent, por debajo de tasas de utilización saludables para muchos sectores de aproximadamente 80 percent.2 Esto indica que, para los bienes manufacturados, aunque la producción mundial está aumentando, la oferta global subyacente supera la demanda global subyacente.

En 2024, la manufactura mundial generó $16.6 trillion dollars en producción económica, frente a $16.4 trillion en 2023, según datos del World Bank. No obstante, según estimaciones del gobierno de Estados Unidos, la utilización de la capacidad manufacturera mundial se mantiene entre 75.0 y 75.9 percent, por debajo de tasas de utilización saludables para muchos sectores de aproximadamente 80 percent.2 Esto indica que, para los bienes manufacturados, aunque la producción mundial está aumentando, la oferta global subyacente supera la demanda global subyacente.

El umbral de 80% parece estar tomado de la literatura sobre capacidad excedente en el acero.

El tema pasa entonces de la teoría comercial al derecho comercial, que no siempre están alineados, como ilustra la legislación antidumping. La USTR también parece estar definiendo la capacidad excedente estructural de manera distinta a como describió la sobrecapacidad en el 2025 National Trade Estimate Report.

Como señala Global Trade Alert:

The definitional scope is measurable. In the 2025 National Trade Estimate Report, published a year earlier, USTR discussed overcapacity for two economies : China (steel, aluminium, solar, electric vehicles, batteries) and Indonesia (mineral ore export bans contributing to steel overcapacity). The Section 301 announcement applies ‘structural excess capacity’ to 16 economies. USTR’s Background section defines two analytical layers: evidentiary indicators (trade surpluses, low capacity utilisation, sector overcapacity, unprofitable firms) and seven policy interventions said to cause them (production subsidies, wage suppression, state-owned enterprise activities, market access barriers, lax environmental or labour protection, subsidised lending, and currency manipulation). Across all 16 economies, the announcement documents 33 evidentiary indicators but cites only seven specific policy interventions. For ten economies, it identifies symptoms but leaves the causes subject to investigation. Three economies illustrate the breadth of the definition. Switzerland is cited for currency intervention and sterilisation of foreign exchange inflows, with no industrial overcapacity evidence and no policy interventions identified beyond currency practices. The NTE’s Switzerland chapter discusses tariffs, agricultural subsidies, sanitary measures, and data localisation; it contains no mention of overcapacity, currency manipulation, or trade surplus as a concern. Norway is cited for recycling oil revenues through its sovereign wealth fund rather than its domestic currency; its bilateral surplus with the United States is $1.9 billion. The NTE’s Norway chapter contains no reference to currency practices, sovereign wealth operations, or overcapacity. Japan runs a global goods trade deficit of roughly $36 billion but is included on the basis of its bilateral surplus and the share of unprofitable firms in its economy. Divergence from the National Trade Estimate Report The S301 and the NTE diverge significantly. A systematic review of the 2025 NTE across all 16 targeted economy chapters finds that the S301’s core categories scarcely appear in the NTE’s analytical vocabulary. Neither currency intervention, undervaluation, nor zombie firms feature as concerns anywhere in the document. ‘Overcapacity’ is confined almost entirely to the China section and one brief Indonesia reference. The divergence extends to policy causes: the NTE documents instances of USTR’s own seven policy interventions far more extensively than the S301 does. Market access barriers, for instance, are documented in the NTE for 15 of the 16 targeted economies; the S301 does not cite market access barriers as a cause of overcapacity for any of them, though some country sections describe practices (such as Indonesia’s export restrictions) that could plausibly be characterised under that heading. The NTE is a document about the causes of trade distortion. The S301, at this stage, documents indicators and leaves most causes unspecified. The definitional scope is measurable. In the 2025 National Trade Estimate Report, published a year earlier, USTR discussed overcapacity for two economies : China (steel, aluminium, solar, electric vehicles, batteries) and Indonesia (mineral ore export bans contributing to steel overcapacity). The Section 301 announcement applies ‘structural excess capacity’ to 16 economies. USTR’s Background section defines two analytical layers: evidentiary indicators (trade surpluses, low capacity utilisation, sector overcapacity, unprofitable firms) and seven policy interventions said to cause them (production subsidies, wage suppression, state-owned enterprise activities, market access barriers, lax environmental or labour protection, subsidised lending, and currency manipulation). Across all 16 economies, the announcement documents 33 evidentiary indicators but cites only seven specific policy interventions. For ten economies, it identifies symptoms but leaves the causes subject to investigation. Three economies illustrate the breadth of the definition. Switzerland is cited for currency intervention and sterilisation of foreign exchange inflows, with no industrial overcapacity evidence and no policy interventions identified beyond currency practices. The NTE’s Switzerland chapter discusses tariffs, agricultural subsidies, sanitary measures, and data localisation; it contains no mention of overcapacity, currency manipulation, or trade surplus as a concern. Norway is cited for recycling oil revenues through its sovereign wealth fund rather than its domestic currency; its bilateral surplus with the United States is $1.9 billion. The NTE’s Norway chapter contains no reference to currency practices, sovereign wealth operations, or overcapacity. Japan runs a global goods trade deficit of roughly $36 billion but is included on the basis of its bilateral surplus and the share of unprofitable firms in its economy. Divergence from the National Trade Estimate Report The S301 and the NTE diverge significantly. A systematic review of the 2025 NTE across all 16 targeted economy chapters finds that the S301’s core categories scarcely appear in the NTE’s analytical vocabulary. Neither currency intervention, undervaluation, nor zombie firms feature as concerns anywhere in the document. ‘Overcapacity’ is confined almost entirely to the China section and one brief Indonesia reference. The divergence extends to policy causes: the NTE documents instances of USTR’s own seven policy interventions far more extensively than the S301 does. Market access barriers, for instance, are documented in the NTE for 15 of the 16 targeted economies; the S301 does not cite market access barriers as a cause of overcapacity for any of them, though some country sections describe practices (such as Indonesia’s export restrictions) that could plausibly be characterised under that heading. The NTE is a document about the causes of trade distortion. The S301, at this stage, documents indicators and leaves most causes unspecified.

También vale la pena señalar que hay varias industrias en las que la utilización de la capacidad está por debajo de 80% y exportan.

Hay más discusión de Evenett aquí, en el contexto de Estados Unidos y China.