Los administradores del fondo de pensiones de Nigeria están debilitando discretamente el motor demográfico necesario para mantener solventes sus propios sistemas. Al refugiarse en la aparente seguridad de la deuda pública, el capital institucional está dando la espalda al sector tecnológico de alto crecimiento que emplea precisamente a la generación que se espera financie las obligaciones futuras: ese es el argumento central presentado por Samuel Frank Chigozirim de Sahara Impact Ventures.

El fondo de pensiones de Nigeria supera actualmente los ₦31.48 billones. Sin embargo, el entorno macroeconómico ha creado una fuerte trampa de rendimientos, y Frank sostiene que ese dinamismo es el principal obstáculo que impide que el capital fluya hacia la economía de innovación.

"I think one thing that is blocking them is due to the current attractiveness of government borrowing," Frank explains. "If they are getting 14, 15, or 16% in a year from a government-backed security, they would rather just do that and be sure because this is pension and these are people's retirement plans. So rather bank on that safety than explore the risk."

Un tope sin piso

Aunque la Pension Reform Act de 2014 permite legalmente exposición a private equity, no la exige. La National Pension Commission (PenCom) estableció un tope máximo para la asignación a venture capital, pero no dispuso una colocación mínima. Frank señala esto como un fallo estructural de política, especialmente en comparación con el financiamiento de infraestructura.

"There is a cap, but there is no floor, and I think that's the problem," Frank states. "We see this especially in the case where they have been mandated to invest in infrastructure. You see a lot of infrastructure funds raising money from the PFAs because there is a mandate to deploy at least 5%."

Conectar la tubería temprana con un cálculo de $1 billion

Para romper este ciclo de estancamiento, responsables de política y líderes del ecosistema debaten la mecánica de redirigir un 5% obligatorio de los activos de pensiones hacia inversiones en startups. Según Frank, la escala de esta inyección de capital doméstico reescribiría de forma fundamental el ecosistema de venture capital en Nigeria.

"Now, 1.5 trillion at a very basic conversion rate of 1,500 comes to about $1 billion in extra funding," Frank calculates. Para poner esto en perspectiva frente a los flujos de inversión extranjera directa, señala que el financiamiento total para venture capital africano en 2025 alcanzó aproximadamente $3 billion, mientras que Nigeria captó $343 million. "So 1 billion alone is about 3 times that number. Three times what came in in one year alone is what can be unlocked."

Este capital no busca inflar valuaciones de etapas avanzadas. En cambio, Frank sostiene que apunta deliberadamente a un fallo crítico del mercado al financiar empresas en etapas pre-seed y seed, donde la tubería local es más débil y los inversionistas de etapas posteriores suelen tener dificultades para encontrar suficientes negocios invertibles.

"One of the biggest gaps that we've seen with regards to VC funding or the VC ecosystem in general in Africa is that there is a widening gap of businesses that are not funded at the pre-seed and seed stage levels," Frank notes. "For people who write larger cheques, Series A and Series B, they are struggling to find businesses they can back because there is no adequate pipeline for them."

El modelo económico que respalda esta asignación de 5% se basa en multiplicadores macroeconómicos significativos, y descompone la inyección de $1 billion en un horizonte disciplinado de diez años.

"If you pull out $1 billion and spread this over 10 years, that is $100 million," Frank explains. "If it's allocated to 1,000 businesses, that is $100,000 per business, fitting perfectly into the pre-seed and seed stage levels."

El resultado inmediato de este modelo es una creación de empleo agresiva. Según Frank, una startup promedio hoy cuenta con siete a diez miembros clave del equipo.

"This gives you 7,000 to 10,000 employees, which can grow two times within a year. In 10 years you are looking at 140,000 to 200,000 jobs being created," he models. "If you multiply this by the average family size of, like, six people, you're looking at about 1.2 million people being impacted by just PFAs bringing out 5%."

La contribución al PIB se apoya en una base sumamente conservadora en la que los negocios financiados generan solo $50,000 en ingresos anuales, lo que representa un descuento de 50% respecto a su financiamiento inicial.

"For 1,000 businesses making $50,000 in annual revenue, that is $50 million in added GDP," Frank calculates, proyectando que en diez años "this comes to about $2.75 billion". Esto excluye por completo el potencial al alza de posibles unicornios. "To become a business valued over $1 billion, you technically have to be doing at least $100 to $200 million in annual recurring revenue. But we are just looking at businesses that will just keep doing only $50,000 in a year."

Un caso de autopreservación para los administradores de pensiones

El argumento más urgente de Frank se centra en la autopreservación de los propios administradores de pensiones. Una base de aportantes que envejece y se desconecta amenaza con reducir los activos bajo gestión.

"We are seeing young Nigerians actively not even contributing to pensions because they already earn money from social media," he warns. "People who are on TikTok or making money from Facebook, from Instagram, from being influencers – they are not thinking about pensions. So there is already a large pot of cash that the PFAs are currently losing out on."

"The greatest liability currently facing the pension industry is inaction," Frank asserts.

Projeta que si los 10,000 negocios financiados aportan un mínimo de $2,000 cada uno por año en nombre de sus empleados, eso inyectaría $20 million anuales al sistema. "In 10 years, that is 3 trillion Naira added to the AUM they have. This is regardless of the 1.5 trillion that they've already put in."

Capital local frente a mandatos denominados en dólares

Los ecosistemas tecnológicos africanos siguen dependiendo en gran medida del capital de riesgo extranjero, que impone estrictos mandatos denominados en dólares. Frank señala que la liquidez local de las pensiones introduce una paciencia esencial y contextualizada al mercado.

"With local capital there is more patience because there is that contextual understanding of the market," he argues.

La turbulencia macroeconómica entre 2021 y 2024 lo ilustra claramente, según su visión. "If a business got $1 million in 2021, around 300 million Naira, by 2024, when the exchange rate went all the way up to 1,500, for the business to still record the same dollar metrics of revenue, the business has to make five times as much," Frank details. "Under foreign mandates, that business has not grown, but if that were local currency, that business would have performed excellently well."

El financiamiento doméstico también cambia de forma radical la dinámica de poder a favor de los fundadores locales. "You are having local people form part of your boards," Frank notes, eliminando la fricción de explicar los cambios económicos internos a miembros extranjeros de juntas.

Además, simplifica las estructuras de cap table y legales de los fundadores. "It's easy for you to have your HoldCo and OpCo here in Nigeria rather than trying to operate a Delaware entity or a Mauritius entity or a UK entity and stressing about all of the legal and tax obligations," he adds, pointing to special economic zones like Itana as ideal domestic launchpads.

En términos de rentabilidad, Frank sugiere que los fiduciarios de los fondos de pensiones pueden anticipar un perfil realista de Internal Rate of Return de 12% a 18% en un horizonte de 10 a 15 años. "Exits can happen easily when there is strong local backing," he states. "Businesses that are selling themselves off to their partners or listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange without trying to hit USD milestones."

Una estructura SPV con salvaguardas incorporadas

Llevar a cabo este giro requiere una arquitectura que proteja explícitamente los ahorros de jubilación de los trabajadores. Frank aboga firmemente por un Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) en lugar de un enfoque fragmentado de fund-of-funds.

"My preferred structure would be an SPV that is jointly managed by officials of PenCom and seasoned professionals from the PE and VC space," Frank recommends. Esta estructura híbrida otorga a los administradores una supervisión operativa inmediata. "The PFAs also have stronger oversight and do not have to wait for reporting if it's a fund-of-funds model," he adds.

Para cumplir con mandatos fiduciarios estrictos, Frank describe salvaguardas regulatorias que considera no negociables. "One of the interesting guardrails that can be set is for there to be co-investments with already established local PE and VC funds," he proposes. Además, subraya que protecciones complementarias sobre gobierno corporativo, umbrales de deuda y cronogramas escalonados de desembolso de capital deben incorporarse directamente en cada term sheet.

De manera crucial, todo este marco deja segura la gran mayoría del capital de pensiones. "Remember that these businesses they are backing are early-stage businesses. Likely the founders are still in their early 20s and 30s and still have about 20 to 30 years to retire," Frank notes. "And as I said, this is just 5% of their entire pool of capital, leaving 95% untouched."

Ci Gaba de Ghana como modelo regional

Nigeria no tiene por qué construir este marco en el vacío. Frank señala a pares regionales como referencias probadas, destacando específicamente el fund of funds Ci Gaba de Ghana, que comprometió con éxito 5% de los activos domésticos de pensiones y seguros al venture capital local.

"The Ci Gaba model is one where we need to borrow their policy notes and understand the power of systematic collaboration," he urges.

"The biggest liability currently facing the pension industry is inaction"

Al abordar los riesgos inevitables de altas tasas de fracaso de startups, posibles escándalos y asunción de riesgos, Frank sostuvo que la carga operativa recae directamente en el Special Purpose Vehicle administrado conjuntamente, que sigue respondiendo estrictamente ante los reguladores y los aportantes institucionales.

"If there is a liability, everyone, and the SPV in particular, would bear the brunt because this SPV would be reporting to PenCom and the PFAs," Frank explained.

Sin embargo, reformuló por completo el riesgo, insistiendo en que la mayor amenaza para las pensiones de Nigeria no es el fracaso de la cartera, sino la inercia institucional. "The biggest liability currently facing the pension industry is inaction," he warned, cuestionando si los administradores preferirían ver cómo su base de aportantes se contrae en deuda soberana o construir un fondo más grande, creador de empleo, que reponga continuamente los activos de pensiones a largo plazo.

"Rather than seeing scandals as failures, we see them as ways to iterate or pivot the model," he reasons. "One case is the Electoral Act. Almost every four or eight years we have an amendment to fix unforeseen gaps. Good leadership is owning responsibility."

Una hoja de ruta de 12 meses

Para pasar de la discusión teórica a una política económica concreta, Frank trazó una hoja de ruta clara de 12 meses.

"I want to see stakeholder convenings and an actual bill being sponsored as a follow-on to the Nigeria Startup Act, driven by the National Assembly alongside NITDA and NIDCOM," he concludes.

Para Frank, la justificación de la política exige mirar más allá de los obstáculos inmediatos. "What is the grand story at the end of it all?" he asks. "The grand story is that 10,000 businesses can be supported, over 200,000 jobs created, up to 1.2 million people lifted out of poverty, and a GDP rise of over at the very minimum $3 billion."